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Abstract
This thesis investigates the public participation in agreements reached between various
government agencies and the polluter, General Electric, regarding extensive PCB
(polychlorinated biphenyl) contamination in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. In this case, government
acted as a trustee on behalf of the public's interests in the negotiations. All individuals involved
in the negotiation signed contracts of confidentiality, preventing the government agents from
sharing details of the negotiation with the public. This stipulation jeopardized the trust between
the community and the government agencies and set very real limits on the potential for
meaningful public participation. The purposes of this investigation were to: (1) examine these
limits resulting from the decision to negotiate with General Electric, (2) make comparisons
between the negotiation process and the process followed for sites on the National Priorities List,
(3) identify services that the government agencies failed to provide to the community, (4) assess
the value added by the public participation mechanisms provided to the public, (5) use the
Ashford/Rest model to make suggestions for enhanced public participation in similar cases, and
(6) evaluate the application of the Ashford/Rest model to this case.
A site summary provides an overview of the case, including the progression of PCB
contamination in Pittsfield, the resulting investigation, and the identification of stakeholders and
key negotiators. Chapter Two explains the evolution and involvement of the community groups,
government agencies, and other stakeholders in more detail, including the choice whether or not
to list the site on the National Priorities List. A literature review summarizes some modern
theories on community participation, defines effective involvement, and examines various
participation opportunities. Professor Nicholas Ashford and Dr. Kathleen Rest have developed a
model for ideal community involvement from the study of several Superfund sites. Only sites
where the public participation was considered to have been "successful" were included in the
Ashford/Rest case studies. In Chapter Four, the Ashford/Rest model is used to evaluate the
effectiveness of the community involvement in Pittsfield. The thesis conclusion offers some
final insights into the case and comments on the adequacy of the Ashford/Rest model in
evaluating the public participation in Pittsfield.
Thesis Supervisors: Dr. Nicholas A. Ashford
Professor of Technology and Policy
and
John DeVillars
Lecturer of Urban Studies and Planning
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Introduction
The Site
In 1903, General Electric purchased an electric transformer manufacturing plant from Stanley
Electric in Pittsfield, Massachusetts. As the nation's power needs increased exponentially, GE's
success boomed. The plant expanded to include 250 acres of Pittsfield land, bordering the
Housatonic River. At its peak, the site employed 15,000 people. The transformer manufacturing
plant began to produce and use PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls) in 1929 when the federal
government required the use of an insulating and surge suppressing device or chemical. PCBs
are excellent chemicals for this purpose. They were used in the form of an odorless, tasteless,
colorless, oily liquid. During the manufacturing process, millions of gallons of PCBs were
spilled or leaked into the ground and river, which was not specifically prohibited by law at that
time (The Berkshire Eagle 1998).
Unfortunately, at the time of their use, people were not aware of the hazards of PCBs in the
environment. PCBs bioaccumulate in fish and mammals and can reach levels thousands of times
higher than ambient levels because the organic chemicals are stored and not readily excreted
from the body. For example, in the late 1990's, a four-month-old bald eagle killed by a train
along the Hudson River (another GE PCB contamination site) was found to have high enough
levels in its fatty tissues to be disposed of as hazardous waste (Sandvik 1998). As scientific
knowledge increased over the years, PCBs were found to be a likely carcinogen. "Likely" means
that animal studies show PCBs cause cancer; however, one cannot say "definite carcinogen" and
also allow for the scientific uncertainty of extrapolation to humans. A likely carcinogen is the
worst official ranking, above probable carcinogen, which is above possible carcinogen, etc.
(ATSDR 2000).
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
The unintended environmental and human health impacts from industry's use of PCBs, CFCs,
and asbestos helped motivate Congress to pass the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976
(TSCA). The main purpose of the Act was to prevent the entrance of inadequately tested
chemicals into the market by providing regulatory controls for chemicals that may threaten
human health or the environment. In the case of PCBs, it was not until hundreds of millions of
pounds of the chemical were released into the environment that their persistence and toxicity
began to receive attention (Office of Toxic Substances 1976). PCBs were one of the first
chemicals regulated under TSCA; Section 6(e) mandates the development of regulations for
PCBs. In February of 1978, thirteen months after the Act went into effect, EPA issued rules for
marking and disposing of PCBs. In April of 1979, EPA issued final rules prohibiting the
manufacture of PCBs. Three months later, PCBs processing, distribution, and all non-enclosed
uses were prohibited (Ashford 1996).
PCB contamination is perceived as a serious threat to human and environmental health.
Communities across the country are now dealing with PCB contamination and cleanup, but few
cases are as serious as in Pittsfield (EPA 2000). The standards for remediation set by the TSCA
are stringent, requiring 99.9999% PCB destruction using incineration for remediation (TSCA
1976). Prior to determining the appropriate cleanup regime, stakeholders must examine several
site factors, such as the geology and hydrology of the site, the degree to which the pollution
should be removed, and the costs of the remediation. Site testing must be done to determine the
extent and boundaries of the contamination. Once this is done, there are several PCB cleanup
processes to choose from. These include incineration, in-situ vitrification, bioremediation,
chemical dechlorination, solvent extraction, and stabilization. These methods have been
evaluated in their ability to meet the TSCA standards (Amend 1992).
After the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) responded to the mandate in TSCA by
banning the use of PCBs, GE substituted other spark suppressors, such as Freon, dry type, and
mineral oil. These replacements were not as effective spark suppressors or insulators in the
electric transformers, reducing the transformers efficiency slightly. They were also more
expensive for GE to use. However, they pose much less of a human health risk (Michael Carroll
2000).
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of
1980 authorizes the federal government to identify actual or potential hazardous waste sites and
take corrective action to remedy the situation. Corrective Actions include all measures that EPA
sees fit, from investigations, studies, and injunctions to full-scale cleanups. Polluters' liability is
joint and several, meaning that responsible parties can be liable for the entire cost of cleanup
even if they only contributed to the problem in part. EPA determines the quality of the cleanup
under the CERCLA, and can sue responsible parties for up to three times the cost of the cleanup,
recovering funds and imposing a monetary penalty (Section 107). The Act established the
National Priorities List (NPL). The NPL is a list of the highest priority hazardous sites. The
EPA composes the list after making initial site inspections and calculating a numerical score
based on the findings. The unhealthiest sites are placed highest on the list (CERCLA 1980).
The legislation requires EPA to inform other interested parties affected by the contamination and
the cleanup of contamination (mainly those who had suffered losses, community members, local
and state officials) on the progress of the cleanup and lawsuit (Section 117). Congress did not
intend for CERCLA to compensate parties who had suffered losses from the contamination
(Section 310). Other laws provide these individuals with the standing to sue the responsible
parties, such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, tort law,
etc. (Ashford 2000).
The Superfund law sent a strong message to industry that the government was serious about
enforcing these environmental regulations. However, there have been many problems with
CERCLA, including: more money spent on legal fees than on remediation fees, some remedies
have been inappropriate, not enough sites have been cleaned up, cleanups are too slow, and cost
recovery from the responsible parties has been inadequate, to name a few. Therefore in October
of 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). SARA
allowed EPA to tailor cleanups specifically to the site, instead of forcing everything to be
cleaned up to residential standards. Properties need to have a "final solution," which can include
easements on the remediation - meaning sites are (sometimes far) less than pristine. SARA
allows for settlements to take place outside of court and increases state and local participation in
the cleanup process, in an attempt to speed up cleanups, and therefore cleanup more sites (SARA
1986).
CERCLA also provides for Natural Resources Damages (NRD), to be estimated by a Natural
Resource Damages Council (NRDC) made up of representatives from government agencies
trained to valuate natural resources. The NRDC assesses the damages and either brings a claim
to the courts to recover the damages or settles with the responsible party out of court. These
damages include not only the cost to restore the area, but compensatory damages for the loss of
the benefit the natural resources could have provided while they were damages and while the
remediation was ongoing. CERCLA requires the NRDC to consider public input in the creation
of a restoration plan for the remediated area. Restoration does not begin until remediation has
been completed. CERCLA provides a general model for NRD actions concerning hazardous
wastes, not petroleum contamination sites (EPA 2001).
The Investigation
An official investigation of the GE Pittsfield site began in 1981 when GE signed a consent
agreement with EPA and the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA
DEP). This was an agreement to allow and contribute to an investigation of the PCB
contamination that had occurred over the 50 years of the chemical's use. In 1982, GE submitted
a report, Past Hazardous Waste Disposal Practices, which identified only four off-site
contamination areas. In 1983, GE additionally reported that there were several thousand pounds
of PCBs in the river. This level of pollution in the river created a great level of concern - not
only in Pittsfield, but also in all areas down-river from GE. For example, the Connecticut DEP
pursued GE on this issue, and in 1984 GE agreed to study cleanup alternatives that would take
into account the concern that PCBs would be washed down into Connecticut. As a result of their
research, in 1985 GE proposed to move the river rather than undertaking the much more costly
remediation of the soil. This solution was not acceptable to anyone but GE (The Berkshire Eagle
1998).
Investigations continued, and in 1989 more polluted sites (not on GE property) were reported.
Pollution spread beyond the manufacturing grounds because of the nature of the manufacturing
practices. For example, "Fuller's earth" was used regularly at GE. According to Webster's
Dictionary, Fuller's earth is "a highly absorbent clay-like substance." This absorbent dirt was
used to cleanup spills and filter the oily PCBs during PCB production and the manufacture of
transformers. The dirt was distributed free-of-charge to anyone who wanted it for yard fill. The
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also used the contaminated soil during the 1940's to fill oxbows
in an effort to straighten the Pittsfield reach of the Housatonic River (EPA 2000).
In 1990, GE agreed to let the Massachusetts DEP investigate the plant site, the river, former
oxbows, and Silver Lake.' In preparation for an expensive cleanup, GE began a study
investigating the utility of bacterial breakdown of PCBs, hoping for an innovative, less intrusive,
and relatively inexpensive solution. Ultimately, the bioremediation project failed. In 1994, U.S.
Senator John Kerry made a public statement charging EPA to use Superfund to force GE to
cleanup the Housatonic River. GE removed some of the PCBs from the river in 1995. At that
time, this was the largest cleanup of PCBs in history. Still, it was only a portion of the pollution.
In 1996, GE was ordered to cleanup a hot spot of PCBs in the river by EPA (using emergency
Superfund authority). Next, residential contamination was discovered and publicized (The
Berkshire Eagle 1998). Many residents began to have their yards tested. Some were
contaminated up to 50,000 ppm (part per million), many times over the EPA safe limit of 2ppm
(Olson 2000). In 1997 EPA used Superfund again to force GE to conduct source control on the
Pittsfield facility. Source control was needed because even though the plant had been closed
since 1989, the contamination could still leak and spread from the existing site. Cleanup of the
site is still far from completed (EPA 2000).
1 According to Massachusetts General Laws, it is unlawful to take samples from private property to test for
pollution. If GE had not granted permission, authorities would have needed a warrant from the court, stating that the
testing was necessary because the public was in imminent danger of harm from the pollution (Shutkin 2001).
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Other Relevant Legislation
The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 (SWDA) was passed as title II of the Clean Air Act
(CAA). The Act provided for developing federal waste management plans and sharing the costs
of making surveys of waste disposal practices and problems with the states. The Resource
Recovery Act of 1970 amended SWDA, shifting the concern of the legislation from solid waste
disposal efficiency to the reclamation of materials and energy from solid waste (SW<DA 1970).
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 was also an amendment to the
Solid Waste Disposal Act. The 1976 Act provided clear expectations (through a permitting
program) for the handling of hazardous and nonhazardous municipal and industrial waste from
cradle to grave. The main goals of the Act were to prevent future contamination of the
environment, minimize human health risks, reduce the amount of waste generated, and to
conserve energy and natural resources (RCRA 1976). The Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments (HWSA) of 1984 increased the comprehensiveness of the RCRA requirements and
expanded the EPA's enforcement authority regarding hazardous substances. The 1984
Amendments represented the federal government's attempt to prevent future cleanup problems
by prohibiting land disposal of untreated hazardous wastes, setting liner and leachate collection
requirements for land disposal facilities, setting deadlines for closure of facilities not meeting
standards, and establishing a corrective action program. Hazardous Substances are defined by
the EPA to include various substances listed as chemicals of concern under other environmental
statutes, such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, with the exception of petroleum
products (HWSA 1984).2
2 The petroleum exclusion refers to petroleum products' exception as hazardous materials. The exception includes
xylene, benzene, and other hazardous substances that are normally added in the refinery process. However,
hazardous substances added to petroleum after the refinery process are regulated under CERCLA (HWSA 1984).
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CHAPTER 1. Site Summary
1.1 Brief History
The case study examines some of the consequences from the toxification of Pittsfield, a quiet
town in western Massachusetts. A large local employer, General Electric (GE), had been
operating in the community since 1903, and had begun using the toxic chemicals (PCBs) in
1929, long before their environmental and human
health hazards were well understood. The company 2
complied with national laws in 1979, which banned
the chemicals' use. Unfortunately, much damage had
already been done to the community, including but
5 6 6 5
not limited to the people, the environment, the wildlife,
and the local economy. Current United States Figure 1.1. - Basic structure of PCBs.
Chlorine atoms can occupy any of the
legislation holds General Electric legally responsible numbered positions. Where they do not, a
hydrogen atom occupies the site.
for damages to property and the environment, but not
for damage to human health.
History of PCBs
In 1929, the federal government began requiring the use of an insulating and surge suppressing
device or chemical in transformers. Air-cooling of transformers was difficult, expensive, and
unreliable. PCBs were especially well suited for this purpose. The PCB oil was used to transfer
heat from the transformer coils to the metal housing surrounding the coils, which dissipated the
heat generated. PCBs were also used as a dielectric medium in heavy-current capacitors, as
hydraulic fluids for lifting gears and the like, as heat transfer fluids in heat exchangers, and as
fluids in temperature regulators and temperature sensors (The Berkshire Eagle 1998).
In response to this 1929 regulation, the Swann Chemical Co. began manufacturing
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a highly toxic mixture of chemicals. Monsanto Industrial
Chemicals Co. purchased Swann in 1935 and continued producing PCBs until they were banned.
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In less than 50 years, Monsanto and other manufacturers (including GE) produced and sold more
than one billion pounds of PCBs. Industry and the public were generally not aware of the health
and environmental hazards of PCBs during the time of their use (The Berkshire Eagle 1998).
PCBs are bioaccumulative; they build up in the fatty tissues of fish, humans and other mammals.
They can potentially reach levels that are thousands of times higher in organisms than the levels
in the ambient environment (water, soil, and air) because bioaccumulative substances are not
readily excreted (Ashford 2000). PCBs can also travel by air. The vapors can remain in the air
for up to ten days, enabling the chemicals to disperse over a large range (ATSDR 2000).
In 1970, reacting to concerns over PCB accumulations in the environment, Monsanto began
voluntarily restricting its sale of PCBs only to manufacturers of sealed electrical equipment. In
1976, Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act for implementation in 1979. The Act
required the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, created by President Nixon in 1970, to
identify and ban the manufacture of certain hazardous chemicals (EPA 2000). As knowledge of
PCBs impact on biological systems increased over the years, PCBs were defined to be "likely" 3
carcinogens (ATSDR 2000). In 1979, the ban went into effect, prohibiting the manufacture of
PCBs and PCB-containing products and established strict regulations regarding their future use
and sale (EPA 2000).
General Electric in Pittsfield
General Electric purchased an electric transformer manufacturing plant from Stanley Electric in
Pittsfield in 1903. As the nation's power needs increased exponentially, GE grew rapidly to
meet demand. The plant expanded to include 250 acres of Pittsfield land bordering the
Housatonic River, employing 15,000 people at its peak (Olson 2000). The General Electric (GE)
manufacturing facility in Pittsfield, Massachusetts used PCBs in their electric transformer
manufacturing processes from 1929 until the 1979 ban. During that time there were no
regulations regarding the use of PCBs, therefore little attention was given to their containment
and disposal. As a result, during the transformer manufacturing process, millions of gallons of
3 The rating of "likely" is the highest rating available for carcinogens (ATSDR 2001).
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PCBs were spilled, leaked, or disposed of improperly, and ultimately found their way into the
soil, the groundwater and the Housatonic River (The Berkshire Eagle 1998).
General Electric intentionally and unintentionally released PCBs into the soil and water of
Pittsfield. GE did not report, monitor, or attempt to cease this pollution because of the lack of
environmental laws and policies. Anthropogenic and natural transport mechanisms have since
spread the toxic chemicals throughout several surrounding towns and south into Connecticut.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and General Electric agreed to a cleanup plan,
ratified in October 2000, that will largely remove, contain, and/or control the PCB contamination
in and around the land surrounding the GE facility, the Housatonic River, and other
contaminated sites (EPA 2000).
The Investigation
An investigation of the GE Pittsfield site began in 1981 when GE signed a consent agreement
with EPA and the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA DEP). General
Electric agreed to allow and contribute to an investigation of the PCB contamination that had
occurred over the fifty years of the chemicals' use by the company's Pittsfield facility. In 1982,
GE submitted a report, "Past Hazardous Waste Disposal Practices," which identified only four
off-site contamination areas. In 1983, GE additionally reported that there were several thousand
pounds of PCBs in the Housatonic River. This level of pollution in the river generated great
concern - not only in Pittsfield, but also in all areas down-river from the GE facility. The
Connecticut DEP pursued this issue with GE, and in 1984 GE agreed to study cleanup
alternatives, taking into account the concern that PCBs would be washed down into Connecticut.
As a result of their research, in 1985 GE proposed to move the river rather than cleaning up the
soil, as remediation of the river would be a more costly solution. The MA DEP, CT DEP and
EPA did not accept this cleanup solution (The Berkshire Eagle 1998).
Investigations continued throughout the 1980's. In 1989 there were reports of more off-site
pollution. Pollution had spread beyond the manufacturing grounds due to the nature of the
manufacturing practices and the actions of the people involved in the processes. For example,
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GE workers had regularly used "Fuller's earth," which is a highly absorbent clay-like substance.
This absorbent dirt was used to cleanup spills and to filter the oily PCBs for reuse during PCB
production and the manufacture of transformers. The contaminated dirt was piled on-site and
then distributed free-of-charge to anyone who wanted it for yard fill. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers also used the tainted soil during the 1940's to fill oxbows in an effort to straighten the
Pittsfield reach of the Housatonic River (Bonarrigo 2000). Through this and other mechanisms,
the contamination was unwittingly spread far beyond the GE facility itself.
In 1990, GE agreed to let the MA DEP investigate the plant site, former oxbows, Silver Lake,
and the portion of the river that borders the plant site. Thinking ahead to the possibility of a
potentially expensive remediation effort, GE began investigating the utility of bacterial
breakdown of PCBs. This form of PCB cleanup has yet to be successful in situ (The Berkshire
Eagle 1998).
In 1994, the situation received further public attention when U.S. Senator John Kerry publicly
charged the EPA to use Superfund to force GE to cleanup the Housatonic River. (He had
recently gone canoeing on Silver Lake and was compelled by its beauty to push for its cleanup.)
GE removed some of the PCBs from part of the river the following year. At the time, it was the
largest PCB cleanup ever accomplished. Yet, it was only a small portion of the PCB pollution in
Pittsfield (Olson 2000). In 1996, the EPA ordered GE to cleanup a PCB "hot spot" in the river (a
highly concentrated area of PCBs in the river sediment). Extensive contamination of residential
sites was discovered and publicized shortly after the EPA mandate (The Berkshire Eagle 1998).
Many residents began to have their yards tested. Some suburban areas were contaminated up to
50,000ppm (parts per million), which is exceedingly high compared to the EPA safe limit of
2ppm for residential properties. The EPA used Superfund authority again in 1997 to force GE to
conduct pollution source control on the Pittsfield facility as the PCB contamination could still
leak and spread from the existing site. Cleanup of the site remains far from completed (Olson
2001).





Pittsfield Economic Development Authority (PEDA)
Community Groups: 4
Housatonic River Initiative (HRI)
Housatonic River Restoration, Inc. (HRR)
Get R.E.A.L. (Residents Environmental Action League)
Citizens for PCB Removal
Housatonic Valley Association (HVA)
Berkshire Natural Resource Council
5
H.E.A.L. (Housatonic Environmental Action League)
4 None of the community groups were permitted to attend the negotiations.
5 H.E.A.L. is a community group based in Connecticut, with members from along the CT stretch of the Housatonic
River. Although the group is not directly involved in Pittsfield, H.E.A.L. works with the HRI and others in
Pittsfield to learn more about the contamination of the Housatonic.
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State Level Actors
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA DEP)
Massachusetts Department of Public Health (DPH)
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (CT DEP)
Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution
Massachusetts Attorney General's Office (MA AGO)
Connecticut Attorney General's Office (CT AGO)
Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA)
Federal Level Actors
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)
1.3 The Negotiation
On October 7, 1999, the chief negotiators for the Pittsfield site stakeholders reached a
comprehensive agreement relating to General Electric's Pittsfield facility and the Housatonic
River. U.S. District Court Judge Michael A. Ponsor approved the Consent Decree on October
27, 2000. The several hundred-page agreement, the Consent Decree, represents the conclusion
of a long, tiresome struggle fought by representatives from GE and the government agencies
(mostly EPA) to reach a consensus on the Pittsfield PCB contamination (EPA 2000).
The Consent Decree provides for cleanup of the Housatonic River and associated areas, cleanup
of the General Electric Plant facility, environmental restoration of the Housatonic River,
compensation for natural resource damages, recovery of government funds spent on past and
future response costs, and the effect and form of the Consent Decree. The agreement includes
provisions for enhanced public participation, brownfields redevelopment and economic aid. A
"Definitive Economic Development Agreement" between GE, the City of Pittsfield, and the
Pittsfield Economic
Development Authority The Nevftatin2 Parties
(PEDA) provides for
redevelopment of the GE 0 General Electric Company
Plant facility and $10 9 The City of Pittsfield
Millon i diect conoic Pittsfield Economic Development AuthorityMillion in direct economic
aid for the City of Pittsfield. 0 Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection0 Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General
That agreement became 0 Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
effective upon entry of the 0 Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection0 Connecticut Office of the Attorney General
Consent Decree. EPA's
summary of the Consent 0 U.S. Environmental Protection Agencysummry U.S. Department of Justice
Decree (Appendix A) was * U.S. Department of Interior
postd bfor th oter National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrationposted before the other2000)
parties to the agreement had
a chance to approve the summary to provide the public with the information as soon as possible.
The actual Consent Decree that represented the final, binding agreement between the parties was
made available to the public at four locations (EPA 2000).
The lead negotiator for the Environmental Protection Agency was John DeVillars, Administrator
of EPA New England. Without DeVillars' approval, the negotiations would not have been
possible and EPA would have been required by law to sue GE under CERCLA instead. The
Project Manager for EPA, Bryan Olson, played a key role in negotiations. While DeVillars was
the final word on negotiations with GE, Olson worked closely with the EPA investigators, the
Pittsfield Mayor, GE, Pittsfield citizens, and environmental groups. DeVillars often relied on
Olson to inform him with the latest information so DeVillars could be sharp at the negotiations
(DeVillars 2000).
John (Jack) F. Welch, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Electric was directly
involved in the negotiations. GE had a special interest in resolving the Pittsfield case favorably
because of the impending Hudson River cleanup, a more extensive site. Welch also played a key
role by setting a precedent within the company by permitting the reuse of outmoded facilities,
despite possible liability. Since some of GE's facilities would be reused instead of abandoned
permanently, there would be more potential risk for GE; however, it was advantageous for the
City of Pittsfield to inherit the use of the buildings and property instead of GE leaving a vacant
lot. GE's Vice President of Corporate Environmental Affairs, Steven Ramsey, led the GE team
in the negotiations. Ramsey threatened to challenge the carcinogenic nature of PCBs to draw out
a court battle indefinitely, which would have cost EPA exorbitant legal fees. Ramsey was a
former Chief of the Environmental Enforcement Section for the U.S. Department of Justice, and
was deeply knowledgeable about CERCLA (DeVillars 2000).
Two local politicians Mayor Gerald S. Doyle and Thomas E. Hickey, Jr., the City Council
President for Pittsfield, participated in much of the negotiations (Olson 2001). Hickey was
forced to sell his home and move due to PCB contamination. Hickey's current employer,
General Dynamics, gave him time off to participate in the negotiations (The Berkshire Eagle
1998). Before General Dynamics, Hickey had worked for GE. Mayor Doyle's father was also a
former GE employee (Gray 2001). There were no other members of the community present at
the negotiations (Olson 2000).
Whether or not to include other members of the community was never debated, since it was
understood that doing so would result in GE abandoning the negotiations. Some community
members were comforted knowing that Doyle and Hickey were present. Others, such as the
Housatonic River Initiative, felt it was only a political move on their part. Allegedly, Mayor
Doyle had not attended any of the hundreds of public meetings that had taken place before the
negotiations began. Some residents believed that Doyle's father had even delivered some of the
contaminated fill materials. Others were suspect of Hickey's loyalties, since he had worked for
over 20 years at the Pittsfield plant (Gray 2001).
1.4 Description of Community Groups in Pittsfield
Residents concerned with the PCB contamination began to gather together in the evenings to
trade tidbits of information in an effort to decipher the complex puzzle unfolding before them. A
few would gather one evening, perhaps speak to a neighbor the following week, and then there
would be another person at the next gathering. These informal "kitchen meetings" gave birth to
at least two community activist groups in Pittsfield: the Housatonic River Initiative (HRI) and
Citizens for PCB Removal. The founding members of Get R.E.A.L. were originally part of the
Citizens for PCB Removal. Originally focusing on common issues, individuals chose between
two different paths along the journey. Citizens for PCB Removal originally formed to work on
resident fill issues. Those who broke off to form Get R.E.A.L. focused on residents' lawsuits
against GE; those who remained a part of Citizens for PCB Removal avoided the litigation
issues. A fourth group of people, interested in the allocation of natural resource damages, joined
together to make up the Housatonic River Restoration organization. Unfortunately for all these
groups, the journey is far from over (Gray and Fletcher 2001). Several issues have not been
closed on the case, such as remediation below the two miles of Housatonic immediately
downriver from the GE plant and how to spend the Natural Resource Damages. Also, there is
always the potential for new discoveries of more PCB contamination.
The Housatonic River Initiative (HRI)
Concerned citizens formed HRI in the early 1990's, intending to force GE to cleanup the
Housatonic River and the rest of Pittsfield. HRI has stood out as the most active community
group in Pittsfield. Tim Gray and Mickey Friedman, two men who live in rural towns outside of
Pittsfield City, have been extremely vocal to the government agencies, local media, and other
residents about the dangers of PCBs. Neither man has had any past connection with GE.
Although HRI started out focusing mainly on the cleanup of the Housatonic River, Woods Pond,
and Silver Lake, their interests have expanded to include all issues around PCB contamination in
Pittsfield. For example, HRI filed a motion to intervene against the Consent Decree, unhappy
about the contaminated fill that is to remain across the street from a local elementary school
(dumpsite Hill 78). HRI settled with EPA and dropped the lawsuit against the Consent Decree,
in return for the promise of the installation of a leachate liner for a different dumpsite (Hill 71).
The group is still extremely vocal about wanting treatment of the wastes instead of dumping the
waste in Pittsfield, for instance by publishing research challenging the safety of the dumping and
incensing the community with comparisons of the cost of full treatment to the CEO of GE's
annual salary (Gray 200 1).6
Citizens for PCB Removal
A second group formed in 1997, also from kitchen meetings. This group, Citizens for PCB
Removal, intended to secure for the city: 1) a thorough cleanup, 2) open options for addressing
contamination problems in the future, and 3) the certainty that GE would bear the greatest burden
in the Consent Decree. In a letter to the EPA and the Justice Department, sent soon after the
Consent Decree was made public, Citizens for PCB Removal expressed its dissatisfaction with
6 According to HRI, CEO Jack Welch made $86.3 Million in 1998. HRI estimates the full treatment (vs. dumping)
of soil removed from two miles of the Housatonic, soil from the elementary schoolyard, and from all the residential
and commercial properties on one particularly contaminated street (Newell Street) at about $46 Million, about half
the CEO's annual salary. Dumping costs about 1/10 of treatment methods.
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the Consent Decree on eleven different points (See Appendix B). The group expressed in
interviews that they like and trust the representatives from EPA who had worked with the people
of Pittsfield, but they distrusted MA DEP representatives. They made sure to note that despite
trusting EPA, they did not necessarily agree with EPA on all topics, including Hill 78 (50 yards
from a local elementary school). One member indicated that she "trusted Bryan Olson," (EPA
representative) but doubted a toxic landfill across from an elementary school was safe
(Anonymous Member 2001).
Get R.E.A.L. (Residents Environmental Action League)
This organization formed in 1998, made up of separatists from Citizens for PCB Removal, to
specifically address the needs of residents living on fill properties, including the filing of
lawsuits against GE for property damages. (Citizens for PCB Removal did not want to spend
time and effort on lawsuits.) In the 1950's and 1960's, General Electric offered free fill to
homeowners and developers in Pittsfield. In 1997, testing revealed PCB contamination on
hundreds of properties, up to 25,000 times the EPA safe limit for residential properties. The
testing occurred because of anonymous tips from former GE employees on a toll free number
managed by MA DEP. The remediation of these fill properties are not addressed in the
negotiated agreement; however, the rights of the owners to sue GE for property damages are
compromised by the same agreement. MA DEP assumed the role of managing GE-funded
cleanups of these sites (Orsi 2001).
Citizens were not satisfied with the resident fill cleanups for various reasons, including the
averaging of the contamination instead of achieving the safe limit in all areas of the yard and the
condition of the properties after the contractor's remediation (for example not enough topsoil to
grow grass). The mission statement of the group (as stated by one of their leaders, Bobbi Orsi) is
to address the "many issues directly affecting the lives and rights of homeowners (that) have not
been addressed. PCBs surround our lives. We're fighting to get back what should rightfully be
ours: our homes and our neighborhood." Get R.E.A.L. had demanded "a seat at the table" to
represent residents on fill properties at the negotiations, presenting a petition with hundreds of
signatures to the negotiators. They were told that their concerns were not being discussed at the
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meeting. However, when the negotiated Consent Decree was released for public comment, the
decree listed all the addresses of the contaminated properties found to date. In GE's quest to
limit liability, the decree postulates a finite end point on the responsibility for those properties
(Orsi 2001). Newell Street commercial and residential contaminated property owners filed
motions to intervene against the Consent Decree. The court did not grant an intervention (Olson
2001).
The first 14-18 residential properties were cleaned entirely to the 2ppm residential standard.
After that, the yards were averaged so that less cleanup had to be done. This was perceived as
unfair because the earlier properties were "cleaner" than the properties remediated later. In
hindsight, Get R.E.A.L. wished they had had a Licensed Site Professional (LSP) on board to help
them fight this decision. The decision to average the properties "felt wrong, but they lacked the
knowledge to argue against it" (Anonymous Member 2001). EPA and MA DEP offered support
through public meetings and home visits. The agencies provided a handbook on PCBs, but the
information contained in it was too basic to be useful. It was a good start, but left people
powerless. MA DEP and EPA did include their own phone numbers in the handbook so that
citizens could call with questions, but according to one member of the group, "We didn't even
know the right questions to ask" (Orsi 2001).
A representative from HRI had visited the affected neighborhoods, updating the residents on the
information HRI had gathered and their experiences with the agencies and GE thus far. The
representative advised the residents that there were experts in the community that could provide
technical assistance. He promised HRI's assistance, but HRI was unable to help enough. After
it was too late, the residents came to the conclusion that they had needed someone with a full-
time job providing technical assistance, not just volunteer workers with other responsibilities.
They were struggling to read a plethora of complicated documents on their own (Orsi 2001).
A year and a half later, a representative from Toxics Action (an environmental groups outside of
the community) suggested applying for a technical assistance grant. The MA DEP gave the
residents a $10,000 technical assistance grant, which the group used to finally hire a LSP.7 By
then, over 80 properties had been remediated, most with the averaging technique contested by
Get R.E.A.L. It was too late for the LSP to impact the averaging policy for future cleanups. The
LSP reviewed the remediation plans, made suggestions, and crafted a point system to prioritize
cleanups which took into account how much people use their yards by factoring in children
living in the home, gardens, etc. He also provided residents with more detailed fact sheets on
PCBs. But after only six months, the LSP changed careers (Orsi 2001).
Housatonic River Restoration, Inc.
The Housatonic River Restoration, Inc. (HRR) was formed in the late 1990's to address post-
remediation issues and the distribution of millions of dollars in natural resource damages (NRD).
After the remediations are completed, the responsible party is usually forced to pay an amount of
money to restore the remediated areas to their natural state or other agreed upon condition. With
NPL sites, this dollar amount is estimated at the end of the cleanup, and once the site is removed
form the NPL, the natural resource trustees have three years to take recourse if more damage
compensation is needed. The trustees form a Natural Resource Damages Council (NRDC). In
the case of the Housatonic River, the damages8 will be shared between Massachusetts and
Connecticut (Olson 2001). The NRDC for the Housatonic is comprised of representatives from
the following government agencies: NOAA, DOI, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, MA EOEA
(Fish and Wildlife Division), CT DEP, and the CT Bureau of Natural Resources (BNR). The
purpose of the NRD is to "restore injured natural resources and the services they provide to the
greatest extent practicable." NRD also compensates the public for injury to the environment and
lost use of the environment before, during and after response actions or "compensatory
restoration." The compensatory restoration projects begin after remediation has been completed
and are administered by the natural resource trustee agencies (EPA 2001).
7 Hiring a LSP for the community was no easy task. Any LSP that had done contract work for GE in the past could
not work for the citizens due to a "conflict of interest." Get R.E.A.L. was unable to find an LSP without a conflict
of interest west of Worcester, which is located over an hour east of Pittsfield.
8 Primary Restoration Cost + Compensatory Restoration Cost = NRD
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The NRD Sections of CERCLA state that the trustees must develop a restoration plan with
public input (EPA 2001). Housatonic River Restoration (HRR) believes all people of the
Berkshires should share decisions regarding the restoration of the Housatonic River. To that end,
HRR has engaged the many people and groups who really care about the river - residents,
municipal leaders, children, farmers, sportsmen, businessmen, scientists, environmental
advocates and others. HRR wanted to be ready, if asked or not, with a plan detailing the use of
the funds. They had several goals, most importantly to reach consensus with as many
individuals as possible. In the creation of a restoration plan, HRR had direct contact with over
1,000 individuals or groups living or working near the river. This project was funded by EPA,
the Massachusetts Environmental Trust in partnership with the Berkshire Taconic Community
Foundation, and a "Communities Connected by Water" Grant from the Massachusetts EOEA
(Fletcher 2001).
The second goal was to achieve longevity of their plan, asking these participants to adopt an
active role with regards to taking care of the river instead of hiring outside parties to come in,
restore the habitat, and depart, leaving local residents out of the process.
"A new generation of alienated residents could await us if we do not capitalize on
the sentiment and opportunity of the moment and lay the groundwork for real
change. Just as we the residents of Berkshire are the stewards of the river-out of
love, not legal mandate-our vision and broad involvement must guide the
expenditure of Natural Resource Damage funds in order to ensure a permanent
success. If these funds are used for one-time fixes instead of comprehensive, self-
perpetuating programs, we will have lost the battle yet again, and another fifty
years down the road a fresh round of restoration will be necessary. But if we do
invest in such a long-range plan, and in the spiritual as well as physical restoration
of the river, and if we bestow that task upon those who will inevitably be
responsible for its maintenance, we will have made the most of this moment. Not
only will we accomplish the removal of existing contamination, PCBs chief
among them, but we will raise a cohort of children who will watch carefully and
prevent such wanton destruction from ever occurring again. We will not only
preserve land along the banks and up the mountains' slopes, but ensure that all the
land that feeds the river, whether developed or not, is managed with river and
aquifer health foremost in mind" (The Housatonic River Restoration Plan 1999).
In 1998, HRR published a professional document detailing a comprehensive, permanent plan for
the care of river. HRR delivered the document to the NRDC, and hopes it will dictate how the
funds from the NRD are used. The document discusses the goals of HRR and the synthesized
views of over a thousand individuals (Fletcher 2001).
Citizen's Coordinating Council (CCC)
The Consent Decree specifies the formation of a Citizen's Coordinating Council to achieve
enhanced public participation. The objective stated in the decree is as follows: "to implement
this agreement in a manner that considers and utilizes the ideas of the citizens of Berkshire
County." The Citizen's Coordinating Council has been established to serve as a focal point for
community participation in the cleanup. Ironically, the majority of the cleanup has been
determined by the Consent Decree, which did not allow for formal and direct public
participation. The Council includes leaders from Berkshire County's political, environmental,
community, and business sectors. The Council has provided and will continue to provide an
important mechanism to ensure that all of the settling parties fully honor their commitment to
listen to, learn from, and incorporate the ideas and concerns of the community to the greatest
extent possible. It will not be possible for the Council to impact anything already outlined in the
Consent Decree. The governments intend to submit drafts of major technical documents to the
Citizens Coordinating Council for review and discussion (Consent Decree 2000).
The CCC meetings take place during the first week of every month, after work in the public
library. A professional mediator from the Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution runs the
meetings. The group is not a grassroots organization like the others discussed in this section,
primarily because the agencies created the group, and not the residents. The meetings are public,
and some members at the table are from the other local groups, such as HRI, Citizens for PCB
Removal, Housatonic River Restoration, Inc., and Get R.E.A.L. Pittsfield (Manasewich 2001).
H.E.A.L. (Housatonic Environmental Action League)
Representatives from this community group first attended a Pittsfield CCC meeting in May 2000
(CCC 2000). The group came to express its interest in joining Pittsfield in the fight of
community groups to force GE to clean more of the Housatonic River. The Consent Decree
specifies remediation plans for only the first two miles of river extending downriver from the GR
plant site, and establishes a process for determining further remediation activities downstream of
the first two miles. However, the entire Housatonic River, all the way through Connecticut until
its outlet into Long Island Sound, has been contaminated by GE's PCBs (EPA 2001).
1.5 Timeline for Pittsfield, Massachusetts
1903
General Electric began transformer manufacture at the 250-acre plant, which GE purchased from
William Stanley, inventor of the power transformer.
1929
General Electric complied with a federal law, which required PCBs in transformer manufacture.
1940s
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the City of Pittsfield filled in eleven oxbows with
contaminated soil from the GE site in an attempt to straighten the Housatonic River.
1964
General Electric began reducing PCB discharges to Housatonic River and Silver Lake.
1965
Congress passed the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), the first federal law specifically
regulating hazardous waste disposal.
1968
General Electric recorded the spill and subsequent cleanup of over 1000 gallons of PCBs onto
riverbank soil and to the Housatonic River sediments. Adequate cleanup level was determined
by sight (i.e. "looks clean").
1970
President Nixon established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Congress passed the
Resource Recovery Act, amendments to SWDA.
1976
Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), which outlined the phase-out of
PCBs from industrial and other uses. Congress also passed the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), regulating hazardous waste from "cradle to grave." Locals attending the
University of Massachusetts conducted the first known study of PCBs in the river.
1977
The Environmental Protection Agency banned the use of PCBs.
1980
In response to the Love Canal tragedy, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund Law).
1981
General Electric, EPA, and the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection signed a
Consent Decree requiring the study of contamination and cleanup strategies in the Housatonic
River.
1982
General Electric identified only four off-site contamination areas in a report to EPA. The MA
DEP closed the Housatonic River to all but catch and release fishing on account of high levels of
PCBs in fish tissues and river sediments.
1984
General Electric established an agreement with the Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection to study more of the river, since PCBs were believed to have migrated downriver into
Connecticut. Congress passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HWSA), which
increased the comprehensiveness of RCRA.
1985
General Electric proposed digging a new river instead of dredging the Housatonic to avoid waste
treatment costs.
1986
Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), allowing
easements for Superfund sites.
1989
Several sites of PCB-soaked fuller's earth were reported but not yet addressed by the EPA or the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection.
1990
General Electric agreed to let the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
investigate the plant site, the portion of river flowing along the site, former oxbows, and Silver
Lake. Simultaneously, General Electric investigated the utility of bacterial breakdown of PCBs.
1991
Concerned residents formed an environmental action group called the Housatonic River
Initiative (HRI).
1993
GE reported their research conclusion that no further studies of the upper river were necessary.
1994
United States Senator John Kerry publicly called for EPA to force General Electric to cleanup
the Housatonic River after canoeing on Woods Pond, just south of the center of Pittsfield. EPA
obtained permits through RCRA to perform further investigations on the GE site.
1995
General Electric cleaned up some of the PBC contamination by the river in the largest PCB
cleanup effort in history. Negotiations between EPA, GE, and MA DEP began.
1996
EPA used their emergency Superfund authority to force General Electric to cleanup a PCB hot
spot in the river, a case of "risk of imminent harm."
1997
Residential contamination announced by MA DEP, who takes charge on the residential cleanup
issue. EPA issued a CERCLA Section 106 Order to conduct source control on the GE facility.
Concerned residents living on fill properties formed action group called Citizens for PCB
Removal. Locals also formed the Housatonic River Restoration, Inc. (HRR) in the late 1990's to
address post-remediation issues and the distribution of natural resource damages (NRD).
1998
Initial cleanup agreement reached between EPA, General Electric, and the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection after a breakdown in negotiations. A public comment
period of 60 days began when the notice of the proposed Consent Decree was published in the
federal register. Some residents in Citizens for PCB Removal formed another group, Get
R.E.A.L., focusing on residential fill and lawsuits for property damages.
1999
"The People of Berkshire County" formerly shared their opinion by publishing The Housatonic
River Restoration Plan with the Housatonic River Restoration, Inc. Mayor Doyle rated 80%
satisfaction in the City of Pittsfield; this was the highest rating for a Pittsfield mayor ever.
2000
Federal Court legalized the 1998 Consent Decree. Connecticut environmental group H.E.A.L.
joins the CCC meetings in Pittsfield, and succeeds in establishing quarterly CCC meetings to be
held in Connecticut.
1.6 Pittsfield Demographics
Pittsfield is a small city of almost 46,000, isolated from other small towns in a picturesque rural
setting. Residents of the town are primarily white, making up almost 93% of the population of
the city (U.S. Census 2001). The Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General classifies
Pittsfield as an "economically depressed area" (MA DEP 2001). The City has an unemployment
rate that exceeds the state average by 25% or more, primarily because General Electric, once
employing 15,000 workers, has downsized their Pittsfield plant to only about 500 workers (Gray
2001). GE has joined many multinational firms in their decision to relocate manufacturing to
other countries where labor is cheaper and environmental laws are less stringent.9 Over the
1990's, GE's U.S. employment fell from 243,000 to 150,000, but its offshore employment
actually expanded. GE's Executive Vice President Frank P. Doyle acknowledged, "We did a lot
of violence to the expectations of the American workforce." (Greider 1997, p.216)
The areas of the town with the most severe contamination are located closest to the plant and the
river. The population within one mile of the site is comprised of seven percent (7%) under the
age of 10 years old, and eleven percent (11%) between the ages of 10 and 19 years old. There
has not been a publicized attempt by local residents or government officials to correlate property
values with refill properties. However, it is known that the average income of households within
a one-mile radius of the site is $21,999 (Bonarrigo 1998). One resident has mapped disease
clusters, which seem to be concentrated in the refill areas. The Department of Public Health has
not performed any formal disease mapping. The refill properties were traditionally owned and
lived in by GE plant workers (Gray 2001).
9 A United Nations survey found that multinationals "adopted lower environmental standards in their operations in
developing countries than those in developed countries, thus exposing workers and communities in developing
countries to dangers that would not be accepted in developed countries." The reason cited is a "greater concern over
maximizing profitability... rather than ensuring maximum safety of their operations." (ESCAP/UNCTC 1990)
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1.7 Site Maps
Map of Western Massachusetts, the Housatonic River, and the site of the PCB
contamination in and around Pittsfield, Massachusetts. Photo: EPA Website
CHAPTER 2. Site Profile
2.1 Initial Recognition of Problems at the Site and Early History
The Pittsfield community was largely accepting of General Electric's releases of toxic PCBs into
their environment. In fact, since GE employed most residents or their loved ones, the
community had little incentive to cause a problem with the company. In 1976, a few
undergraduates (including local Tim Gray) from the University of Massachusetts were the first to
perform a scientific investigation of the river. The students uncovered what most in the town
already knew or suspected; very high levels of PCB contamination were present in the
sediments, fish, and frogs of the Housatonic River (Gray 2001). The UMASS studies in part led
to a large investigation by MA DEP and EPA in 1980. (Other reasons for the study included
obvious signs of other types of contamination, such as raw sewage.) During the 1980's, the
public largely, if not entirely, ignored the investigations conducted by EPA and MA DEP, which
GE agreed to voluntarily. PCB contamination in the river was not news for them (Olson 2001).
It was not until after the downsizing of the Pittsfield plant, which left many locals jobless, that
the contamination became news. Citizens began to wonder what would happen to the river and
the land if GE left behind all that contamination. Since only 500 out of the once 15,000 GE jobs
remained in Pittsfield, few people feared the consequences GE could bring by leaving the
community entirely (Gray 2001).
2.2 The Decision to Study the Site
An investigation of the GE Pittsfield site began in 1981 when GE signed a consent agreement
with EPA and the MA DEP. This was an agreement to allow and contribute to an investigation
of the PCB contamination that had occurred over the fifty years of the chemicals' use. In 1982,
GE submitted a report entitled "Past Hazardous Waste Disposal Practices," which identified only
four off-site areas. In 1983, GE additionally reported that there were several thousand pounds of
PCBs in the river. This level of pollution in the river created a great level of concern - not only
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in Pittsfield, but also in all areas down-river from GE. For example, the Connecticut DEP
pursued GE on this issue, and in 1984 GE agreed to study cleanup alternatives that would take
into account the concern that PCBs could have been or could be washed down into Connecticut.
As a result of their research, in 1985 GE proposed to move the river instead of cleaning up the
soil (much more costly). This proposal was not acceptable to anyone but GE (The Berkshire
Eagle 1998).
Investigations continued, and in 1989 more polluted sites (not on GE property, but former
oxbows of the river) were reported. Pollution spread beyond the manufacturing grounds because
GE donated used "Fuller's earth" to the City of Pittsfield and local residents for fill purposes.
According to Webster's Dictionary, Fuller's earth is "a highly absorbent clay-like substance."
This absorbent dirt was used to cleanup spills and filter the oily PCBs during PCB production
and the manufacture of transformers. The dirt was distributed free-of-charge to anyone who
wanted it for yard fill. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also used the contaminated soil
during the 1940's to fill oxbows in an effort to straighten the Pittsfield reach of the Housatonic
River (EPA 2000).
In 1990, GE agreed to let the Massachusetts DEP investigate the plant site, the adjacent portion
of the river, former oxbows, and Silver Lake.' 0 In preparation of an expensive cleanup, GE
began a study investigating the utility of bacterial breakdown of PCBs, which ultimately failed.
In 1994, U.S. Senator John Kerry made a public statement charging EPA to use Superfund to
force GE to cleanup the Housatonic River. GE removed some of the PCBs from the river in
1995. At that time, this was the largest cleanup of PCBs in history. Still, it was only a portion of
the pollution. In 1996, GE was ordered to cleanup a hot spot of PCBs in the river by EPA (using
emergency Superfund authority). Next, residential contamination was discovered and publicized
(The Berkshire Eagle 1998). Many residents began to have their yards tested. Some were
contaminated up to 50,000ppm (part per million), many times over the EPA safe limit of 2ppm
(Olson 2000). In 1997 EPA used Superfund again to force GE to conduct source control on the
'
0 According to Massachusetts General Laws, it is unlawful to take samples from private property to test from
pollution. If GE had not granted permission, authorities would have needed a warrant from the court, stating that the
testing was necessary because the public was in imminent danger of harm from the pollution.
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Pittsfield facility. Source control was needed because even though the plant had been closed
since 1989, the contamination could still leak and spread from the existing site. Since an
agreement was reached between the government agencies and GE in 1998, remediation activities
have been continuing according to the Consent Decree.
2.3 The Original Decision to Act
A national survey conducted by the federal government in the 1960's indicated that
approximately 75% of the American people believed that the federal government did the "right
thing" most of the time. By the early 1990's, only 20% of Americans shared this faith. The
surveys conducted in the 1990's suggest that Americans believe the government wastes 48 cents
of every dollar. Over 80% of citizens stated that they wanted "fundamental change" in
Washington. The public viewed federal agencies as monopolies, not out to serve the taxpayer
but to justify their own existence and meet the needs of politicians (Gore 1998). This national
paradigm shift mirrors the changes that happened on a local level in Pittsfield.
The fact that Pittsfield, the Housatonic River, and the GE site were home to hazardous pollution
was not unknown to GE workers, members of the community, or to officials in the local
government. Many factors, such as the establishment of the EPA in 1970, Congress passing
environmental health and safety legislation, and an increasing national awareness of
environmental issues (heightened in the late 1970's by the highly publicized Love Canal
incident) contributed to a growing concern over contamination in Pittsfield. However, GE's
downsizing of the Pittsfield plant was the main reason a decision to act was made by the
community. People became demoralized and bitter after losing their jobs. They reflected more
on the production processes, especially in light of new research on PCBs and other hazardous
man-made chemicals. They began to question their assumptions that something or someone had
been protecting them from harm.
The creeping change in perception within the community, coupled with the results from the
results from studies conducted by UMASS students, caught the attention of the MA DEP, who
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was the first agency to conduct official site investigations on the GE Pittsfield plant site. New
safe limits, promulgated by the agency, required the agency to act. The extent of the
contamination and its severity necessitated the involvement of the EPA by law. However, on a
local level, the Pittsfield community distrusted the EPA. Residents felt that the "feds" were too
removed from the realities of living with contamination and could not empathize with their
situation. Businesses viewed EPA as a threat to their success and development and feared EPA
would label Pittsfield a toxic waste dump. Environmentalists were skeptical about EPA's
effectiveness. The City government wanted to fight GE, and did not know if EPA would help or
hinder those intentions. MA DEP was in conflict with the EPA over who would take charge of
the situation (Bonarrigo 2000). These conditions led to the formation of several community
action groups (See Section 1.4).
2.4 Superfund versus Negotiated Settlement
Once the federal government had become involved in the case and the degree of the pollution
had been uncovered, the next step was determining how to proceed. On September 25, 1997,
pursuant to Section 105 of CERCLA, EPA proposed the overall Site for inclusion onto the
National Priorities List (NPL). The sites listed on the NPL are commonly known as Superfund
sites. Superfund refers to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA), passed by Congress in 1981. Superfund sites are severely polluted
areas that threaten public health. The federal government has approximately $150 Million in the
fund. This fund can be used to begin cleanup efforts while the government sues the polluter to
reclaim government expenditures (Doyle 2000). From the point of view of the EPA, Superfund
is usually a good choice for expensive remediation situations because the polluter usually ends
up paying for the cleanup and EPA sets the standards that the site must meet to be considered
clean. However, this process cannot guarantee that the full costs of the cleanup will be recovered
in the lawsuit. Usually the EPA and the polluter reach some compromise (Bonarrigo 2000).
Despite Superfund's power, not everyone thinks using CERCLA is a good idea. According to
Mayor Doyle, the possibility of Superfund was "like a threat over the city's head." One reason
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for this view is that the people who live in Pittsfield were concerned about the stigma associated
with being publicly labeled one of the dirtiest places in America. They were afraid of losing
even more jobs and businesses and therefore more tax dollars, leaving the remaining residents
worse off (Doyle 2000).
People were also afraid that all the "red tape" of dealing with the government bureaucracy would
stall any cleanup efforts and drag them out indefinitely. They worried that no one would be
accountable for the cleanup, and therefore no one would be accountable for achieving results
(Olson 2000). They were concerned that with the long list of Superfund sites, Pittsfield might be
overlooked, or not get the amount of funding needed to do a thorough cleanup (Doyle 2000).
Residents in the community were afraid that whatever method was used to force GE to remediate
the contamination, that it would not start soon enough. Understandably, once people began to
realize the extent of the pollution, residents wanted it cleaned up yesterday.
These concerns led to the decision made by EPA New England's Regional Administrator, John
DeVillars, to attempt a negotiation with General Electric, instead of pursuing the listing of the
site on the NPL. In October 1997, EPA and several other agencies (See Section 1.3) formed an
intergovernmental team and, with the assistance of a mediator, initiated negotiations with GE.
EPA called off negotiations on April 6, 1998, after seven months of talks.
Letter from DeVillars to the Community
In a letter dated April 1998, Regional Administrator John DeVillars informed the public that the
negations had failed and the site would be listed on the federal National Priorities List of
Superfund sites. He stated that the "negotiations failed to produce a plan that met the needs and
concerns of Pittsfield and Berkshire County," but that EPA had already developed an action plan
for beginning site cleanup. DeVillars acknowledged the "very real public threats" and made a
commitment to begin cleanup in the fall. He commended the efforts of Mayor Doyle and City
Council President Hickey, who were involved in the negotiations on behalf of the city. A
summary of the action plan was included in the letter, along with contact information for Bryan
Olson, GE-Pittsfield site project manager and Angela Bonarrigo, the Pittsfield contact in EPA's
Community Affairs Office.
Most importantly, the letter addressed and reassured citizens regarding four of the main concerns
within the community, which were as follows:
1. The cleanup might take longer to get started now that the negotiations failed.
2. The Superfund designation will probably stigmatize the city.
3. Because of the stigma, no investors will build here and our economy will suffer with
fewer jobs and fewer tax dollars from businesses.
4. EPA is going to stop communicating with us now that the negotiations have failed.
DeVillars assured the community that EPA would begin the cleanup that fall. EPA had
developed an action plan, which included immediate enforcement orders for critical cleanup on
the GE site and the first two miles of the Housatonic River downriver from the GE plant and a
proposal to GE for conducting redevelopment at the GE site. The letter listed some successfully
handled Superfund sites, which would serve as models for Pittsfield, including economic
redevelopment. Lastly, DeVillars promised the community that EPA would continue to
communicate by establishing a Citizen's Advisory Panel, which would meet with government
officials regularly in Pittsfield. With CERCLA, the process would actually become more
transparent to the public than the closed negotiations. The EPA Action Plan included proceeding
with the Superfund listing process and other authorities (EPA 2000).
However, the negotiations with General Electric resumed on June 17, 1998 and in October 1998,
the parties reached an agreement-in-principle that included a comprehensive cleanup of the
overall site (See Appendix A for a summary of the agreement). On October 14, 1998, EPA
Regional Administrator John DeVillars stated in a press release: "By uniting rather than dividing,
we have achieved not only a sound environmental outcome, but a substantial economic
investment and opportunity, as well. EPA will be a full working partner in turning this plan into
the reality of an economic rebirth for Pittsfield" (EPA 2001). GE and the agencies reached
agreement on the amount GE will pay to reimburse response costs previously incurred and to be
incurred by the governments in connection with the site. The details regarding the specific
reimbursement amounts can found in the Consent Decree. EPA agreed to defer final decision
making on listing the Site on the CERCLA National Priorities List (NPL). EPA may finalize
listing the Site, under certain conditions, including if EPA concludes that a situation exists where
it needs to take over the cleanup work under the Consent Decree due to inadequate performance
by GE, subject to GE's right to dispute resolution (EPA 2000).
After the Consent Decree was filed with the courts, several groups filed motions to intervene.
HRI's court appeal for intervention status threatened to ruin the agreement. HRI was not a part
of the official negotiations with GE and felt that certain aspects of the cleanup were not
addressed satisfactorily. The group wanted a more comprehensive remediation plan. HRI and
EPA agreed to negotiate. The two parties crafted an eleven-point agreement, in which EPA
agreed to provide extra protections in the cleanup, such as a leachate liner for Hill 71. HRI
would have pressed for more precautions had they been present at the negotiations between GE
and the government agencies. According to EPA, if HRI had been a part of the negotiations with
GE, it might have been enough of a complicating factor to prevent any agreement from being
reached (Olson 2000).
CHAPTER 3. Theory of Public Participation
3.1 Definitions of Community
Literature on the topic of outreach often uses the terms community, stakeholders, and public
without differentiation of these terms. In this work, the "community" refers to the individuals,
groups, or small business owners affected by the contamination, either directly or indirectly. The
term "stakeholders" refers to the full range of individuals and groups with interests related to the
contaminated site, which could be health, welfare, economic, and other interests. These include
individuals who regulate, oversee, remediate and revitalize the site, developers, and those
concerned with the environment and the welfare of future generations. The "public" refers to a
broader collection of individuals and groups, including those not necessarily directly or
indirectly affected by the contamination.
3.2 Formation of a "New" Community
In Contaminated Communities, Michael Edelstein defines the term "contaminated communities"
as "any residential area located within the identified boundaries for a known exposure to some
form of pollution" (p.6). He discusses the shared bond that develops between residents
regardless of race, politics, and socioeconomic class. This bond results from the initial trauma
and dread that only grows as residents learn more information about potential hazards of the
contaminants. He illustrates this bond in a case study of Legler, New Jersey. The residents in
suburban Legler preferred their privacy and interacted on a very limited basis with their
neighbors until severe water pollution was uncovered. Afterwards, a new sense of community
and friendship grew between the citizens as they felt a need to share their concerns and
experiences with others who could provide experiential understanding. Residents spoke of
friends living outside the area no longer wanting to visit because they feared exposure. These
experiences of abandonment or rejection amplified the new need to be social with their neighbors
(Edelstein 1988).
Published in 1988, the book presented a revolutionary analysis of the psychological impacts of
living in an area with known toxic exposure. He lists five psychological effects resulting in
changes in residents' outlook on life:
1. "A reassessment of the assumption of good health.
2. A shift to pessimistic expectations about the future, resulting from victims'
perceived loss of control over forces that affect them.
3. A changed perspective on environment; it is now uncertain and potentially
harmful.
4. An inversion of the sense of home involving a betrayal of place. What was
formerly the bastion of family security is now a place of danger. Having
chosen to live there, the person is now deprived of the choice of leaving.
5. A loss of the narve sense of trust and goodwill accorded to others in general;
specifically, a lost belief that government acts to protect those in danger."
(Edelstein 1988, pp. 48-9)
These changes may occur without the individual recognizing the shift, resulting in depression
and avoidance. They certainly affect citizens' ability to organize for activism or participate in
structured mediations or public meetings (Edelstein 1988).
3.3 Contamination Timeline
The Ashford/Rest model proposes a general structured timetable for the possible stages in
contaminated community's case histories. The timetable begins with initial recognition of
problems at the site and early history, followed by the decision to study or investigate the site.
These are interesting aspects of the Pittsfield site history, important in understanding the public
participation. However, this thesis will not discuss several points on the timetable, including the
choice of investigators, the design of the study/investigation, identification of health endpoints of
concern and contamination/exposures of concern, the conduct of the study (sampling,
measurements), or the evaluation/presentation of results because the public was not involved
significantly in these aspects of the case. The government agencies, both state and federal, made
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these decisions on behalf of the public, acting as a trustee. The next stages in the Ashford/Rest
timetable are communication of the results to the community, the decision to act, and in cases of
remediation," the choice of the remediation contractor, and the identification, evaluation, and
choice of options for remediating the contaminated site.' 2  Finally, the timetable ends with the
stages involved in the actual site remediation and the concurrent and post-remediation
monitoring of the site and the monitoring of health indicators in the community (Ashford/Rest
1999).
Contaminated Communities provides a timeline for the toxification of a community. After
pollution has originated in a community, an incubation period usually follows before the
contaminants are detected. After discovery follows a period of shock, and gradually some level
of acceptance of the contamination. Many individuals become active in trying to understand the
situation and future options. However, recovery to normal life is "difficult if not impossible."
Many complications and uncertainties prevent the victims from achieving closure, even if they
move from the site (Edelstein 1988).
3.4 Government Involvement
Chess, Hance, and Sandman's 1988 Short Guide for Government Risk Communication
introduces a hierarchy for public participation in risk examination. The lowest tier is
government acting without communicating with citizens, closely followed by a "government
talks, citizens listen" approach, as with press releases or newsletters. The next two levels of
participation are separated by the intentions of the agency: government asks citizens for input
and either would prefer not to listen or intends to listen. The distinction between the two often
can be determined by the formality of the meetings, the quality of communication between the
two groups, and whether or not there is follow-up or on-going dialogue. The book refers to the
" The Ashford/Rest model provides a scenario for no further action, further study, and remediation. In the case of
Pittsfield, remediation was necessary.
12 Choosing the remediation involves identification of options, evaluation of options in terms of residual
contamination/health risk, followed by choosing an option or combination of options (Ashford/Rest 1999). The
Pittsfield public was completely left out of this negotiation process because of the terms agreed upon between GE
and the government agencies (Olson 2000). However, the public was able to participate through various
mechanisms, in conversations with their elected officials, and during the public comment period (See Section 4.4).
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highest relationship as "power-sharing," which means the government agencies and the citizens
solve problems together. The Pittsfield case falls shy of this category, despite exhibiting some of
the power-sharing characteristics: funding of citizen groups to hire technical consultants and
meetings called jointly by government and citizen groups. However, citizens in Pittsfield were
not a part of the remediation agreement and do not participate in monitoring or implementation
projects. The highest level of participation occurs when citizens act without communicating with
the government, for example in the case of a volunteer fire department (Chess 1988). This level
of public participation is not feasible when dealing with Superfund sites. Citizens need the
financial support and authority of the government to pursue a cleanup with a responsible party.
The manual also presents aspects necessary to foster a trusting relationship between the agencies
and the public.
1. "Be aware of the factors which inspire trust.
2. Pay attention to process.
3. Explain agency procedures.
4. Be forthcoming with information and involve the public from the outset
5. Focus on building trust as well as generating good scientific data.
6. Follow up.
7. Make only promises you are sure you can keep.
8. Provide information that meets people's needs.
9. Get the facts straight.
10. Try to coordinate with other agencies.
11. Make sure you coordinate within your agency.
12. Don't give mixed messages.
13. Listen to what various groups are telling you.
14. Enlist the help of organizations that have credibility with communities.
15. Avoid "closed" meetings." (Chess 1988, pp. 7-9)
Again, involving the community in the process of finding a solution is a key factor in
establishing credibility and trust. In the Pittsfield case, GE forced the government agencies to
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choose between a flawed Superfund process and a negotiation that GE required to be closed to
the public. Choosing to negotiate forced the EPA and other agencies to start off at a
disadvantaged position with the community. To fight that uphill battle, EPA did exhibit as much
as possible the other directives listed by Chess et al. for situations in which the agency is dealing
with a situation in which trust is low: consider how the trust was violated, acknowledge the lack
of trust, specify ways in which the agency plans to rebuild trust, ask those who distrust the
agency what it would take until they feel you are trustworthy, respond on a personal level when
appropriate, share information as soon as possible, and finally, be patient (Chess 1988). This
type of trust-building leadership exhibited by EPA in Pittsfield did win the trust of the majority
of the public.
Hance, Chess, and Sandman's 1990 Industry Risk Communication Manual lists similar trust-
building mechanisms, and presents a parallel hierarchy of public participation in communicating
with industry. It also outlines reasons behind community outrage, such as the unfairness of the
situation, familiar risks versus exotic risks, and open processes versus closed processes (Hance
1990). General Electric has not adopted an open approach in Pittsfield. At times their
representatives have even vilified themselves by remaining silent or aloof about the
contamination (Gray 2000).
3.5 Theories of Community Involvement
In Stakeholder Views of Superfund Sites by Mary English et al., English comments on how the
responsible party's economic relationship to the community affects public participation. If the
polluter is an important part of the local economy, as General Electric was for many years, the
community is often skeptical of the need for a Superfund cleanup. Typically economic concerns
of a cleanup dominate within the community, considering that many members of the community
benefit from the financial success of the polluter, whether they are on direct payroll or profit
from business brought in by the polluter or direct business with the polluter. Furthermore,
English states that in cases where the responsible party is important to the economy, the
community is often concerned with stigmatization from the cleanup and any resulting negative
impacts on future economic development. These concerns lead to a community eager to start a
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cleanup and "get it over with," instead of focusing on the thoroughness of the cleanup (English
1993).
3.6 Evolution of Community Groups
The interaction between government agencies and the public in contaminated communities can
be compared to the interactions of different government agencies with the poor. In his writings
about the anti-poverty movement, Neil Gilbert points out that, "One reason the poor have little
influence upon social welfare institutions is that, unlike most areas of consumption, here they do
not have the alternative of taking their business elsewhere." He comments that a duplication of
the welfare system would be paradoxical, and that those in need of the services are frequently
overwhelmed with life pressures, placing them in a vulnerable bargaining position (Gilbert
1970). Interactions in contaminated communities are similar. The individuals affected by the
pollution almost always lack the financial capacity to cleanup the pollution themselves, and
therefore rely on government to act as a trustee on their behalf. The government subsidizes
industrial activity by using monies such as Superfund to cleanup hazardous sites because the
agencies often fail to force the responsible parties to pay for it themselves. The people most
affected by the contamination have little input on how much contamination gets cleaned up, and
as in the Pittsfield case, where the contaminated material is deposited.
CHAPTER 4. Analysis of the Pittsfield Site Using the
Ashford/Rest Model
In this analysis, public participation refers to the broadest level of inclusion in decisions affecting
the community. The public refers to the affected community and all stakeholders involved with
the contamination. The community is defined to be local residents and small business owners.
The contaminated community refers to those residents and small business owners who are being
affected by the pollution, to their person through exposure pathways or contamination of their
property. The term stakeholders refers to those who have a legitimate interest in the issues that
impending decisions regarding the cleanup will affect, such as a canoe club on a contaminated
river. Perhaps their property is clean and the club does not own the river, but the viability of
their club depends on the health and the club users' perception of the river.
There are three types of public involvement: communication, building skills, and participation in
the process. The first, communication with the public, consists of several types of
communication. The communication can be one-way from the government agencies to the
public, through press releases, newsletters, Internet websites, or information sessions. The
communication can be one-way from the public to the agencies, through public comment periods
and at public hearings. Lastly, the agencies and the public can have two-way communication,
either face-to-face at meetings or workshops, or through responses written to letters submitted
during public comment periods. Skill building involves technical short courses for the public,
technical assistance grants, or providing experts dedicated to working with the public. Active
participation results when there is two-way communication, adequate skill building in the
community, and a commitment from the agencies to work with the public, as a mediator, to help
the public reach the solution it collectively desires (Ashford/Rest 1999).
The Ashford/Rest model differentiates government's role as a trustee for the public or as a
facilitator to reach an agreement within the public. The agreement reached within the public can
be utilitarian or communitarian. A communitarian consensus reflects all viewpoints present
within the community. This type of consensus is more difficult to reach, because it is
challenging and time consuming to draw out the different viewpoints from a variety of groups
within a community. A utilitarian consensus is reached between the self-motivated community
members who took advantage of the available participation mechanisms. With this latter
consensus building process, some viewpoints that exist within the community are never revealed,
and therefore are likely never considered in the decisions reached. The following table, extracted
from the Ashford/Rest model, describes the types of decisions made under each combination of
these conditions.
Government's Role Utilitarian Communitarian
As a Trustee for the Decision made by government - Decision made by
Community reflects a compromise of government - reflects a
different visible community normative consensus of
interests community interests
As a Facilitator of Compromise or consensus Normative consensus
Consensus within the reached by visibly participating reached by community,
Community community members possibly expanded to
interests of all members
Table 4.1: Examining the decisions resulting from the two possibilities for government
involvement and the consensus-building process. (Ashford/Rest 1999, p. VII-14.)
The most important factors for successful public participation that can be distilled from the
Ashford/Rest case studies are as follows:
1. Agency clarity, commitment, and accountability to the community.
2. Direct interaction between the agency and the community and among the various
participants/stakeholders.
3. Top-level commitment within the agency to the project, and little if any turnover
among the public servants working for the community.
4. Several different mechanisms for public participation.
5. Broad representation and diversity of views throughout the process.
6. Trust-building and mutual respect between members of the agency, community, and
other stakeholder groups.
7. A broad view in addressing the community's needs.
The Pittsfield case analysis will address whether or not these tenets were reflected in the public
participation. The formation of several Pittsfield community groups to address different specific
tasks suggests that there were numbers of people who felt that if they did not get involved, a
serious error or omission would be made by the agencies handling the case. Perhaps the
agencies were not spending enough time on a specific issue important to the group, or perhaps
the active individuals did not trust the agencies to do their job well or to act as a trustee of the
community. They must have felt the issues were so personally important that they were willing
to spend their free time, away from their families, to work together on these issues themselves,
rather than trust the agencies to make the decisions without input.
4.1 Trustee versus Mediator
At General Electric's insistence, there was no involvement of the public in the negotiations. Not
only were members of the public excluded from attending all meetings of the negotiators, all
communications were kept confidential by legal agreement. This legal document can be found
in Appendix S of the Consent Decree. It states that "the parties, their representatives, and the
mediator(s) may not disclose information regarding the negotiations, including settlement terms,
proposals, offers, or other written or oral statements made during the negotiations, to third
parties, unless all parties otherwise agree. The negotiations shall be treated as compromise
negotiations under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and applicable state rules of
evidence." The agreement prohibits mediators from appearing in court either by subpoena or
voluntarily (Consent Decree 2000). These terms accepted by the negotiating parties called for
the government agencies involved in the negotiation to act as trustees of the public.
EPA was the lead agency of the several agencies involved in the negotiations (See Section 1.3).
In order to facilitate acting as a trustee for the public, the agency focused on a limited kind of
participation, that of getting the community's views. EPA utilized several public participation
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mechanisms, such as open meetings, letters, press releases to the local newspaper, etc. The
agency gave attention to different ways of participation and scheduling events at varying times to
accommodate different schedules, including making home visits to speak with residents in their
own homes and answer questions (Olson 2000).
In opting to negotiate with GE, the agency accepted the terms to conduct the remediation
negotiations behind closed doors. Once the court ratified the Consent Decree, the remediation
plans for the GE site, the fill properties, the first two miles of river downriver from the GE plant
site, Silver Lake, and Woods Pond were nonnegotiable. The terms were settled, barring new
discoveries of more contamination. The only major remediation issue left to resolve with
General Electric was the rest of the Housatonic River (south of the two-mile stretch throughout
Connecticut). Though many members of the public were satisfied with the Consent Decree,
motions to intervene were filed by some groups, indicating dissent in the community.
Additionally, even if many groups believed the Consent Decree was the best remediation
commitment they could have gotten, they did not necessarily approve of the process. People in
the community groups stated that they would have preferred a more transparent negotiating
process (Fletcher 2001).
After the remediation is completed, the NRD collected from GE will be spent to restore the river
and its banks to a more natural state. Instead of leaving the NRDC, made up of representatives
from government agencies (See Section 1.4), to act as trustees on behalf of the public, a
community group had already been formed to create plans for the funding from the NRD. The
Housatonic River Restoration, Inc. (HRR) formed in 1997 to begin a more communitarian
consensus process, collected input on a restoration plan. The Housatonic River Restoration Plan,
developed by the "People of Berkshire County" and published in 1999, incorporates the views of
over 1,000 local residents. The report was compiled over the course of two years, and describes
a long-term restoration plan to reconnect the local community with the river in a more
participatory way. The plan focuses on the involvement of the members of the community
themselves:
"Years from now, no distant planner in Washington or Boston will comb the
Housatonic's banks for rare plants, lead a fourth-grade class to troll for insects in
the current, fish its waters, canoe its length, or sit quietly on a hillside hearing it
move below. We whose many voices speak as one in these pages will do those
things. The restoration plan for the river will not work unless we are an integral
part of it - equal partners with the agencies administering the funds in planning
and securing the river's fate. If we are not, we will have bought only a little time
instead of an entire future." (The Housatonic River Restoration Plan, 1999, p.2)
The passage makes two key points. It communicates to the participants who contributed to the
plan and the other residents reading the passage that they have a responsibility to pay attention to
the impacts on the river and participate in its care. Secondly, it speaks of the desire of the
community to participate actively with government agencies in decision-making regarding the
river, as opposed to leaving it to the government to act as a trustee on behalf of the community.
Rachel Fletcher, Executive Director of HRR, states that she did not want to "wait until it was too
late" to get involved in the decisions on the distribution of the funds. This was a tremendous
effort undertaken by HRR to visit and interact with such a large amount of people in less than
two years on the river restoration plan. Over 1,000 people were willing to participate. This level
of participation, without the involvement of the Natural Resource Damages Council (NRDC),
indicates a strong desire by the people of the Berkshires to act on their own behalf. HRR played
the role of the facilitator, instead of leaving it to the agencies to facilitate a consensus within the
public. HRR preemptively questioned the commitment and ability of the NRDC to reach a
communitarian consensus; something the initiators of HRR believed essential to sustain
conservation and protection of the river. At the time of this writing, the NRDC has begun to
meet but has not officially responded to the HRR proposal (CCC 2000).
4.2 Key Issue and Conflicts
Key issues and conflicts in the Pittsfield case were as follows: transparency of the decision-
making process, the remediation of the resident fill properties, who would bear the liability of the
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contamination in the future, potential negative effects on the economy, the contaminated
schoolyard, Hill 78 (a PCB dumpsite across from an elementary school), cleanup for the river,
and the participation of Connecticut stakeholders. The government agencies were unable to
secure the public's interest on all of these items, but had informally surveyed individuals in door-
to-door visits and at public meetings during the negotiations to get a sense of the priorities of the
residents. The agencies were willing to contribute supplementary funds to help ensure the safety
of the community, rather than attempt to fight GE in the courts and potentially slow down the
cleanup.
Transparency of the Process
General Electric refused to negotiate unless members of the community were left out of the
process. Although the government agencies worked to make the process as transparent as
possible, there were and are aspects of the negotiation that will never be accessible to the public.
Community stakeholders were frustrated with the lack of information. The public viewed the
process as "secret," which damaged the credibility of the agencies, but the public felt it had no
other choice but to accept the agencies as a trustee of their best interests, for better or for worse.
Although Mayor Doyle and the President of the City Council, Thomas Hickey, represented the
city in the negotiations and are residents of the area, many residents were concerned about the
lack of a non-political community member. A key point in Public Participation in
Contaminated Communities by Nicholas Ashford and Kathleen Rest is that stakeholder
involvement is not equivalent to public participation. The negotiation process in Pittsfield was
not open to the public in any way. Federal and State agencies, GE representatives, and the two
local officials were involved. EPA was the chief agency working with the public on all issues
except resident fill properties, which MA DEP handled.
The Fill Properties and Future Liability
According to members of Get R.E.A.L. Pittsfield, it was unfortunate that MA DEP headed up the
remediation of the resident fill properties. Residents preferred the openness of the talented EPA
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members on the case, and felt they faced more bureaucracy with MA DEP. During the
negotiations, MA DEP gave the residents the impression that discussions on the fill properties
were not part of their interest and not a part of the negotiation. The agencies were permitted by a
consensus of the negotiating parties to inform the public which topics were going to be covered
in the negotiations, but residents were not informed that the fill properties were being discussed.
The fill property cleanup was negotiated between GE and MA DEP outside of the official
negotiations. However, Appendix T of the Consent Decree lists all the fill properties that had
been discovered at that time and binds the Agencies in a covenant with GE not to sue. On page
221 of the Consent Decree, it states that GE is responsible for reimbursement to EPA for any
costs associated with the resident fill properties listed in Appendix T until the properties pose an
acceptable level of risk to human health and the environment. The covenant not to sue
agreement (CNS) regarding these properties begins on page 306, and became effective for each
property upon a written approval to the LSP's response action outcome (RAO) from the MA
DEP. The CNS states the following:
"In consideration of the actions that will be performed and the payments that will
be made by the Settling Defendant (GE) under the terms of the Consent Decree...
the United States, on behalf of EPA, NOAA, DOI, ACOE, DOD, ATSDR, and
any other agency which may have authority to administer the statutes cited in this
Paragraph, covenants not to sue or to take administrative action against Settling
Defendant pursuant to... (various sections of CERCLA, RCRA, TSCA, and the
CWA) for releases or threatened releases of Waste Materials at the site, where
such Waste Materials originated at the GE Plant Area, for performance of the
Work, or for Designated Fill Properties." (Consent Decree 2000, p. 306)
The CNS is dependent on GE fulfilling the specified remedial and/or removal actions
satisfactorily. The Consent Decree also states that if more GE-related contamination is
discovered on the fill properties, GE is liable to fund a response action that will restore safety to
human health and the environment. According to the owners of those properties, it was
disconcerting to see their addresses listed without having been a part of the negotiations. They
were not signatories to the document, and yet they felt as though their rights had been signed
away (Orsi 2001).
Community participation was crucial in the discovery of the fill properties. The many former
GE employees residing in Pittsfield became a living record of where contaminated fill had been
dumped. The company did not keep track of the distribution of the free fill, but individuals
remembered seeing trucks or had even driven trucks themselves. Retirees were concerned that if
they came forward with any information that might hurt GE, they might lose their pensions. A
member of HRI proposed setting up a toll free phone number to receive anonymous tips. MA
DEP adopted the idea and received over 300 phone calls in three to four months (Gray 2001).
The calls were overall very accurate in detailing off-site contamination not previously indicated
by GE. In three years, 289 properties were investigated and 143 were remediated (Olson 2001).
Brownfields Redevelopment And Economic Aid
The Pittsfield Economic Development Authority (PEDA) was concerned with the stigma that
could cast a shadow on the economic livelihood of the region if EPA decided to list the GE
Pittsfield site as a Superfund site. PEDA developed a Pittsfield economic objective, "to utilize
the former GE facility for new development thus preserving undisturbed "greenfields" (EPA
2001). A landmark agreement was reached between GE and the agencies in the Consent Decree,
allowing the GE plant to be available for reuse after the remediation was complete, instead of
leaving 245 acres of vacant land. (Normally GE does not allow reuse of their closed plants
because of liability concerns.) This concession on the part of GE allowed PEDA to incorporate
the former plant site into a blueprint for the economic revitalization of Pittsfield and Berkshire
County. GE, the City of Pittsfield, and the Pittsfield Economic Development Authority (PEDA)
will implement an economic development package including $60 million from GE. Under this
agreement, GE will use $50 million to cleanup its plant site to agreed upon Consent Decree
standards (Item I.C.1), demolish several buildings, provide some funding for building new
buildings, and transfer portions of the property to PEDA for economic redevelopment. In
addition, GE will provide $10 million in direct economic aid to the City of Pittsfield (EPA 2001).
The Contaminated Allendale Schoolyard
The Pittsfield community was extremely concerned with the contamination found in the
Allendale Elementary School. At the time of the school's construction in 1950, GE entered into
an agreement under which GE allowed the City to remove soil Hill 78 to use as fill material on
the school site. The MA DEP conducted soil testing in early 1990 and found detectable levels of
PCBs in the soil. Later that year, the agency requested that GE determine the extent of the
contamination on the property. GE capped the hot spots on the property in 1991. The land was
included in the site that EPA proposed for inclusion on the NPL in September 1997. While
negotiations were ongoing, one of the topics of most concern to the community was the
schoolyard. The site was also included when the negotiations led to an agreement in October
1998. In late 1999, GE removed 41,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil from the school's
backyard, replacing most of onto Hill 78. When the property was restored, GE installed new
recreational equipment and athletic facilities, including a running/walking track (EPA 2001).
Hill 78
Hill 78 is a consolidation site for toxic materials and soil collected from removal actions on the
GE site and other contaminated areas in the town. The Hill 78 site had been a previous GE
dumping ground for approximately 60 years. It is located across the street from the Allendale
Elementary School. Citizens wanted to see Hill 78 removed and treated. The Consent Decree
designates Hill 78 as a consolidation area, with some restrictions. GE may elect to deposit
contaminated soil, which has been unearthed during the remediation process, on top of Hill 78,
but barrels of oil are not allowed on the dumping site. The community groups have not used any
of the technical assistance grant money to hire a professional to evaluate the risks of this area.
EPA has monitored around Hill 78 to ensure that PCBs are not migrating from the site. EPA
feels there is no technical merit to the perception of high risk among some members of the
community. A survey of the parents of the students at Allendale School, conducted by EPA,
indicated that the large majority of these parents trusted EPA's risk analysis of the site (Olson
2001).
The River Cleanup
The Consent Decree divides the river into three segments: the first half-mile, the next one and
one-half miles, and the rest of the river. The Consent Decree also includes agreements reached
on the former oxbows, which were created from the original river. GE agreed in the Consent
Decree to cleanup many of the contaminated oxbows and first half-mile of the Housatonic,
which winds along the plant property and slightly downriver. EPA and General Electric will
share the expense of the next 1.5 miles of the river.13 The Consent Decree refers to the rest of
the river, but calls for further testing.
During the late 1930's and early 1940's, the City requested that the Army Corps of Engineers
(ACOE) straighten the Pittsfield stretch of the river. This process isolated former bends in the
river, creating multiple oxbows. ACOE filled in the swampy oxbows with various materials,
including industrial wastes. GE agreed to cleanup many of these oxbows, and the EPA will fund
the remainder. GE began remediating the first half-mile of the river in October 1999. Upon
successful completion of the removal action, the estimated average concentration of PCBs will
be as follows: 0.16 ppm in the surface sediments, 7.6 ppm in the top foot of riverbank soils, and
11 ppm in the one to three foot interval of riverbank soils (EPA 2001). For comparison,
acceptable levels published by the ATSDR for PCBs in soil are as follows: 2ppm in residential or
agricultural areas, 5 ppm in recreational areas, and 20ppm in commercial/industrial areas
(ATSDR 2001). EPA is studying the rest of river, modeling the hydrodynamics, sediment
transport, and PCB fate and bioaccumulation in the river. After the reports have been completed
and peer reviewed, GE will prepare a Supplemental RCRA Facility Investigation Report,
propose cleanup goals, and evaluate cleanup options (including a no action scenario). After
public comment, EPA will submit a response action plan to GE, which GE has the right under
the Consent Decree to appeal. GE will then be responsible for implementing the final solution
for the rest of the river (EPA 2001).
"3 Estimates indicate that GE will incur $33 million of the costs and EPA will use Superfund to pay the remaining
costs, which is expected to be $12 million.
4.3 Formal Mechanisms for Public Participation
There are several types of mechanisms for public participation, and these can be divided into
three categories: communication with and within the community, building skills and capability
within the community, and community participation with government agencies in the process
(Ashford/Rest 1999). The following sections list and explain several participation mechanisms,
separated by type. In each category, each mechanism is presented in the way government
agencies would be ideally use the mechanism to achieve that type of participation.
Vehicles/Mechanisms for Communication
e Community training for agency and citizen participation





* Community surveys or interviews
e Information repositories
" Public comment periods
e Internet websites
e Newsletters / mailings / fact sheets
" Press releases
Community training for agency and citizen participation facilitates successful communication in
any mechanism, and can reflect a serious commitment of the agency funding the training to
participation of the community. Communication mechanisms between an agency and a
community can work in one of three ways: one-way communication from the agency to the
community, one-way from the community to the agency, or two-way communication between
the agency and the community. Communication mechanisms can also facilitate communication
within the community. Public meetings and public comment periods can inspire two-way
communication. The latter often involves a delay in response from the agency. In order to be
successful, the agency representatives must listen to the community. These meetings are often
more productive if the public is prepared with guidance for asking questions. The agency could
facilitate this by providing speakers from other contaminated communities, which are further
along the timeline, or a list of potential concerns and fact sheets. Attendance of an on-site
agency representative encourages accountability of the agency and increases accessibility for the
public.
Poster sessions can be one or two-way communication mechanisms. If the posters are on display
but not attended to by a representative of the author, it is one-way communication. If an
individual is there to answer questions, it is still one-way, but of a higher quality. Better yet, this
can be an opportunity to have representatives to record and listen to public comment in response
to the presented information. Information repositories, Internet websites, newsletters, mailings,
fact sheets, and press releases represent one-way communication from the agency to the
community. Community surveys or interviews usually represent one-way communication from
the community to the agency; however, interviews can include a question and answer
component.
Vehicles/Mechanisms for Skill and Capacity Building
" Technical assistance grants
" Short technical courses
" Leadership development courses
e Training in coping with and responding to environmental problems
e Officials dedicated to helping citizens (designated information source)
e The development of guidance protocols to aid the asking of questions
e Community driven self-help groups
* Participation as a learning mechanism
* Legal advisor
The theory behind mechanisms for skill and capacity building is to build a common
understanding of the risks due to the contamination, understanding of the technical solutions
proposed, and to build the ability of the community to participate in the process. CERCLA
reflects the importance of these mechanisms, incorporating $50,000 Superfund Technical
Assistance Grants into the options for helping contaminated communities. These grants are
typically awarded to a single community group, with the hope that the group will use the grant to
purchase technical expertise for the good of the entire community (Olson 2001). Agencies can
also elect to provide short technical courses, taught by agency experts or outside experts. These
courses are designed to provide enough information (to those who elect to attend) to enable the
public to understand their situation and the solutions proposed. They can also be a useful
question and answer forum for the community to address technical and scientific questions,
analogous to participation as a learning mechanism. To facilitate these sessions and regular
community meetings, agencies can provide guidance protocols to aid the asking of questions.
Agency representatives dedicated to remain on site as a resource to community members can
also provide technical expertise. This is perhaps not the best use of their time, as might be able
to help more people by holding a short course; however, meeting one-on-one with an agency
official can provide a more comfortable environment for individuals to express their true
frustrations and concerns. Non-technical skill and capacity mechanisms include leadership
development courses and training in coping with and responding to environmental problems, or
the funding of community driven self-help groups (Ashford/Rest 1999).
These mechanisms are designed to empower the citizens, setting into motion their own ideas for
reaching a just solution. When the government acts as a trustee, these mechanisms serve to
provide a check and balance system, as well as help create more meaningful opportunities for
public involvement. When the government acts as a mediator between the contaminated
community and the potentially responsible party, these mechanisms are essential. The
government cannot expect the community to have the expertise needed to make technical and
risk-based decisions. The agencies have a responsibility to assure that a just resolution is
reached.
Vehicles/Mechanisms for Participation in the Process
" Official Citizen Advisory Groups (CAP's, CAB's, etc.)
" Multi-stakeholder committees/panels/workshops
" Utilization of citizen experts
" Designated coordinators for interagency coordination, and subsequent communication
with community
" On-going vehicle to have community voice new concerns and facilitate continued agency
responsiveness
Citizen Advisory Groups14 (CAG) are comprised of representatives from every group within the
community that is affected by the contamination, including residents as well as other
stakeholders. These local individuals meet regularly with the government officials who are
overseeing the contamination remedy. The CAG can have involvement ranging from acting as a
sounding board to a decision-making body. CAG's are similar to multi-stakeholder committees,
panels, or workshops, which can have a less comprehensive representation of the community
and, in the case of panels or workshops, may not meet on a regular basis. Government agencies
can also choose to involve citizen experts as advisors, lending assistance in assessing the
contamination and evaluating the remedy options.
4.4 Public Participation Mechanisms Utilized in Pittsfield
As discussed above, government can play one of two roles in their interaction with contaminated
communities: government can act as a trustee of the public, and secure the public interest on its
behalf, or government can act as a mediator, and facilitate consensus within the community and
an agreement with the potentially responsible party. In the case of Pittsfield, because the
government chose to negotiate a settlement instead of suing GE with CERCLA authority, the
agencies chose to act as a trustee for the public. EPA was the agency that handled the majority
of the public participation efforts.
Communication Mechanisms Used by the Agency
The EPA utilized several public participation mechanisms to facilitate communication between
the public and the agency. The table below lists the mechanisms used by the agency, and the
type of communication that resulted. The meetings, hotline, information repositories, public
comment periods, and websites were and are available to any individual. The newspaper used by
EPA for press releases was the Pittsfield local paper, The Berkshire Eagle. Without purchasing
the newspaper, anyone can access the paper in the public library. Only local residents received
mailings. Anyone could call EPA and arrange a home visit with Bryan Olson or Angela
Bonarrigo from EPA, but typical residents on contaminated fill properties were the only
individuals who utilized this mechanism.
Type of
Mechanisms / Activities Communication
Public meetings or discussions 2-way
Public comment period 2-way
House calls by the agency 2-way
Anonymous contamination hotline Community to Agency
Community surveys / interviews Community to Agency
Press releases Agency to Community
Mailings / fact sheets / newsletters Agency to Community
Internet website Agency to Community
Information repositories Agency to Community
Table 4.2: Types of Government / Community Communication Mechanisms
" A Citizen Advisory Group (CAG) can go by many different names: Citizen Advisory Panel (CAP), Citizen
Advisory Board (CAB), or, as in Pittsfield, Citizen's Coordinating Council (CCC).
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Capacity and Skill Building Mechanisms Used by the Agency
The EPA awarded a $50,000 CERCLA Technical Assistance Grant to the most vocal community
group, the Housatonic River Initiative (HRI). HRI has been actively involved in motivating a
river cleanup since 1991, and had been existence longer than any other community group that
had formed specifically to address the GE contamination problem (Gray 2001). Housatonic
River Restoration, Inc. (HRR) also received a grant from EPA. Instead of a technical grant,
HRR received funding to facilitate the development of the community restoration and
stewardship plan for the Housatonic (Fletcher 2001). MA DEP awarded a $10,000 technical
assistance grant to Get R.E.A.L. Pittsfield. Get R.E.A.L. elected to use the funds to hire a
Licensed Site Professional to help the residents on fill properties interpret documents and to
create a risk analysis protocol for the residents. Get R.E.A.L. also received a grant from EPA to
work with a communications firm in Boston, in order to enable the community to "tell their
story" to other contaminated communities around the nation (Orsi 2001).
Public Participation Mechanisms Used by the Agency
EPA had specified in the Consent Decree that it would like more public involvement with the
case. A provision establishing a citizen advisory panel, the Citizen's Coordinating Council, was
written into the decree. According to DeVillars, "strong community partnerships are key to a
successful environmental and economic recovery." EPA based the citizen advisory panel (CAP)
on the agency's community involvement model developed for the cleanup of the Massachusetts
Military Reservation on Cape Cod.
Agenda Outline for Monthly CCC Meetings EPA hoped that the panel would be
1. Welcome and Introductions comprised of a group of
2. Review of proposed agenda and Notes from the
last meeting
3. Changes to the agenda and Corrections to the notes Berkshire County citizens to ensure
4. Educational presentation
5. Discussion and questions
6. Updates from: GE, EPA, DEP, and NRDC incorporated into the key
7. Next steps
8. Action item confirmations
made by the agency. The board is
comprised of business, environmental, political and community leaders from Pittsfield, South
Berkshire County, and Connecticut. "Our effort must be a team effort," said DeVillars. "This
will help ensure that it is" (EPA 2001).
The purposes of the CCC, as stated in the Consent Decree, are as follows:
1.) To serve as a vehicle for community involvement in the implementation of the
settlement agreement between GE and the government.
2.) To be a mechanism to ensure that all parties to the negotiated agreement are able to
honor their commitment to listen to, to learn from, and incorporate the ideas and concerns
of the community to the greatest extent possible.
3.) To enable representatives of diverse interests in the region to communicate with each
other, and to provide community input and structured feedback to GE and the
government (Consent Decree 2000).
Harry Manasewich, from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution,
runs the CCC meetings once a month. The meetings have a regular agenda that allows for both
flexibility and predictability. Representatives from different stakeholder groups sit around a
large table; others make up the "audience," seated in folding chairs facing the table. At any time
during the meeting, members from the audience can interrupt with questions. The meeting is
used as an educational forum as well as for two-way communication. An education presentation
(primarily from government agencies) on a topic requested by the community members is given
at each meeting. Members from GE and all the government agencies take turns sharing an
update with the entire council and answering questions. Representatives from HRI, HRR, Get
R.E.A.L., and Connecticut's H.E.A.L. regularly attend the CCC meetings.
In reference to the fill properties, the MA DEP held a public comment period and responded in
the form of a letter to a summary of the questions the agency received on various topics (See
Appendix C). The agency established a contamination hotline at the suggestion of a resident, to
facilitate the anonymous reporting of off-site contamination areas in Pittsfield. The agency
received over 300 calls in less than four months (Gray 2001). Residents requested an
anonymous reporting system, despite no substantiation of their fears of losing their GE pensions
(Olson 2001).






































Table 4.1 Public participation mechanisms used by the community groups.
Communication Mechanisms Used by the Community Groups
Collaboration between community groups has been ubiquitous throughout. The first group to
form, HRI, was instrumental in providing the other groups with basic information on PCBs, site
history, and a record of community involvement to date. The group has videotaped every single
public event related to the contamination, including the current CCC meetings. As the other four
groups listed in Table 4.1 formed in the 1990's, each one would have a meeting or a series of
meetings with representatives from HRI who would provide the other groups with considerable
information (Gray 2001).
All the groups send at least one representative to the CCC meetings, including H.E.A.L.
However, the Connecticut group literally does not have a seat at the table; H.E.A.L. members sit
in the folding chairs reserved for the general public. Their representatives still manage to be
active participants in the meetings. The other four community groups in Table 4.1 are officially
part of the CCC (Manasewich 2001).
The Berkshire Eagle, the local newspaper in Pittsfield, was an instrumental communication tool
used by all parties. Until the publication of a near comprehensive list of local businesses that
supported the Consent Decree, the paper had played more of an advocacy role. After that issue,
the paper changed its tone and began to almost exclusively highlight the positive aspects of the
cleanup and economic redevelopment (Gray 2001).
Capacity and Skill Building Mechanisms Used by the Community Groups
In 1998, HRI was awarded a CERCLA technical assistance grant from EPA of $50,000. The
group spent half the money on an epidemiological study of the city, a few thousand to hire a
Licensed Site Professional (LSP) to comment on EPA's remediation plan for the Housatonic, and
plans to spend the last $22,000 on modeling plans for the river (Gray 2001). The MA DEP
awarded Get R.E.A.L. a $10,000 technical assistance grant, which the group used to hire a LSP.
Get R.E.A.L. applied for and was awarded a second grant from another state agency, used to
fund work with a communications firm in Boston so the residents of the fill properties could tell
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their story. The group had learned a considerable amount from talking to people in Woburn,
Massachusetts and in Connecticut who had lived on contaminated properties and gone through
remediations. Get R.E.A.L. hopes their stories will help others in the future - those who discover
that they too are living on polluted property (Orsi 2001). HRR also applied for and received
three government grants, including a $16,000 grant from EPA. The second grant came from the
state, a two-year Massachusetts Environmental Trust Grant. Massachusetts EOEA granted the
group money from a "Communities Connected by Water" fund to finance a student conference.
These grants were used for consensus building mechanisms instead of technical assistance
(Fletcher 2001).
HRR held over sixty public meetings in different locations. Their approach involved going to
talk to people along the river on their own properties to maximize participation. The group used
the third grant to hold a regional student conference, intended to facilitate brainstorming ideas
for restoration of the river and its stewardship. Over 250 students from first grade level to
college attended, along with over 150 others. HRR published a comprehensive restoration plan
in 1999, detailing the strategies created from the input of over 1,000 people. According to
Rachel Fletcher, HRR's executive director, the group strove for a communitarian consensus.
This was partly because the group felt that restoration was the one issue everyone could agree
on. They wanted to take advantage of an opportunity to bring people together on at least one
issue in the divisive strife (Fletcher 2001).
4.5 Criteria for Evaluation
The Ashford/Rest model discusses several vehicles for public participation, focusing on those
that create broad-based outreach, communication, and education of the community, build skills
and capability in the community, and provide for increased community participation in, and
access to, government decisions. The model defines levels of public participation and presents
characteristics useful in evaluating mechanisms. The Ashford/Rest case studies (which
accompany the model) clarify these mechanisms with real examples. Application of the model
elucidates the value of public participation in the case studies.
The model articulates the following ingredients for fair and competent public involvement
mechanisms:
1. Agency clarity on goals and stakeholder roles in public participation
2. Top management commitment to the public participation process
3. Manager/leader goes beyond legal minimum
4. Agency responsiveness to stakeholders
5. Two-way communication and education
6. Interactive and iterative public participation
7. Adequate resources
8. Development of provisional trust between agency and public
9. Giving priority to trust building actions
10. Openness of the agency
The contaminated communities from which the Ashford/Rest model was designed were
Superfund sites. The Pittsfield case is a negotiated settlement cleanup site; however, the model
is appropriate for this case because the contamination at the site is extensive and dangerous
enough to qualify for Superfund status. EPA proposed the site to the NPL, but did not pursue an
actual listing as part of the negotiated agreement. The government did reserve the right to list the
site on the NPL if it becomes necessary in the future. The model is also intended for the analysis
of cases involving more than one federal agency as well as both state and local actors, certainly
the case in Pittsfield. And like Pittsfield, cleanup options and economic redevelopment were
issues of debate at the study sites.
Procedural Fairness
Ashford and Rest list several important elements for evaluating public participation mechanisms
and their proceduralfairness:
* Access to information for all members of the community
e Diversity of community views represented
" Financial and intellectual/technical resources
" Openness, transparent processes
e Trust between citizens and government in overseeing the PRPs
" Trustworthiness (of individual actors acting in an honest, truthful manner faithful to their
announced or perceived roles)
e Respect for different viewpoints and different forms of expression/expertise
e Accountability (of both government to stakeholders and individual participants to their
constituencies); Agencies are committees to reciprocity, responsiveness, follow-up
" Appropriate balance of power (sufficient autonomy of participants from government, and
balance of power among participating interests); public can participate in agenda setting
for the mechanisms, discussion and debate, and development of decision making rules
* Autonomy of the mechanism
Procedural Competence
Mechanisms that exhibit the above traits of procedural fairness are not necessarily effective. In
addition to fairness and accessibility, another measure of effectiveness is the procedural
competence, which the model identifies by the following characteristics:
" Purpose of participation mechanism explicit and understood/agreed to by participants
e Access to knowledge, e.g., information, expertise
" Adequate time to learn about and discuss issues; reflect on variety of viewpoints
" Resources available for participants to obtain the information/expertise they need
" Participants willing and capable of participating
Outcome
Finally, to fully evaluate the effectiveness of public participation mechanisms, one must consider
how well the mechanism achieved its initial aim:
" Did it foster development of mutual understanding among participants and between
participants and agency? (Competent discourse; face-to-face discussion over time)
" Did it enhance equity and control for those affected?
* To what extent did it safeguard the disadvantaged and protect and promote minority
interests and address power imbalances? (How did community members view the
process and outcome of the mechanism?)
e Did shared decision-making take place?
Summary
Although the agency cannot control the willingness of the public to participate, the agency can
influence whether or not participation continues and grows or slowly dies out due to frustration
with the process. The quality of the public's repeated interactions with the agency is under the
agency's control. The Ashford/Rest model provides insight into what constitutes quality
interactions. Attention to the agency's clarity and consistency in answering questions, their
commitment to the participation mechanisms and interacting with the community, and the
agency's accountability all contribute to trust-building and mutual respect. Mechanisms
dependent on two-way communication also facilitate mutual respect. By providing a diversity of
public participation mechanisms, the agency can also help achieve a broader representation and
diversity of views. If the same 15 community members attend the meetings in a town of 15,000,
it is unlikely the agency will obtain an accurate view of the interests and concerns of that
community. The agency needs to have a broad view in working with the public and can be
effective by reaching out through different venues, at different times, with different levels of
interaction. If the same agency employees participate in the different mechanisms, the agency
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will develop a better understanding of the community. These dedicated officials should provide
the community with guidance for asking questions and look to find funding to provide technical
assistance grants or even short technical courses to enable meaningful public participation.
Identifying citizen experts and providing site-specific training for these experts is another way to
provide the community with a valuable local resource.
4.6 Analysis of Pittsfield Public Participation
4.6.1 Analysis of the Role of the Trustee
When acting as a trustee on behalf of the public, the government often utilizes participation
mechanisms that focus on getting input from the community. This input must be resolved into a
single position. This consensus can either be utilitarian or communitarian. EPA strove to reach
a communitarian consensus within the community, incorporating input from all viewpoints
present in the community. However, due to the time constraints of the negotiations combined
with the secrecy required on the content of the negotiations, a utilitarian consensus, less
representative of the community, was more likely reached. Only visible members of the
community participated in the utilitarian consensus building process (Ashford/Rest 1999).
The Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Emergency and Remedial Response
conducted its own study of what constitutes success in community involvement. The results of
the study will be used to improve the community involvement function of the agency. Although
the study is not complete, according to survey responses, residents were not satisfied with the
amount or type of information they received from EPA.15 Residents wanted more information
and more detailed information. The study also found that risk perception was lowest among
those who made use of the public participation mechanisms offered, including public meetings
and reading fact sheets (Bonarrigo 1998).
15 It is important to note that the respondents to the survey were unable to recall which agency had provided what
information. Therefore, although EPA conducted the survey, the results more likely reflect a blend of citizen's
opinions about the involvement of all the agencies, state and federal.
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Within the feedback EPA received from the survey respondents, there were five requests that
appeared repetitively. Residents want 1) a published work schedule, 2) information on property
values, 3) more information on the nature of PCBs including health risks, fate and transport
theory, and a comparison of common Pittsfield levels to "normal" levels, 4) personal
communication before reading about new information in the newspapers, and 5) one agency to
lead the cleanup, hold GE accountable, and make things happen. This latter desire would solve
the problem identified by focus groups that there is a great deal of confusion among local
residents as to what agencies are involved and where information is coming from (Bonarrigo
1998).
EPA's Project Manager Bryan Olson gained the respect and trust of the stakeholders within the
community and in the other agencies. Olson was viewed as an "encyclopedia of knowledge" on
the case, and was able to apply his people skills and engineering background to satisfy concerned
citizens. Olson held himself accountable for providing information and representing the interests
of the public when advising DeVillars on EPA's stance in the negotiations.
According to Angela Bonarrigo, EPA considered itself battling GE for "the heart and soul of the
community." Even though citizen interests were not directly represented in the negotiations of
the cleanup, EPA worked hard to gain acceptance of the decisions they made, especially after the
breakdown of the negotiations. The public was divided into factions, some concerned with
getting a thorough cleanup environmentally and other concerned with the stigma association with
NPL sites and the economic devastation that can bring.
Since 1990, Bryan Olson has been the manager of EPA's involvement at the GE Pittsfield site.
Olson demonstrated his ability to accept responsibility in all his efforts on the Pittsfield case.
According to co-worker Angela Bonarrigo, Olson gave residents the sense that he took
responsibility for what he said. Instead of only reporting on what the "agency's opinion" or
another abstract entity, Olson would state his opinion and indicate that he believed that what he
was saying was true. This accountability helped to quell residents' fears that if something went
wrong, they had nowhere to go. It also allowed the residents to transfer the trust they had in
Olson as a person to EPA and the team working on the Pittsfield case (Bonarrigo 2000).
Olson was a leader in EPA, but more importantly, a leader within official and unofficial
negotiations. Olson and others helped to create a feeling among the negotiators that their goals
and work were intertwined with each other, and that a specific end point could someday be
reached. Agreement on the final goal that would satisfy all the negotiating parties has still not
been finalized (Olson 2000). However, according to others at EPA, Olson behaved as if he were
personally responsible for the outcome (Bonarrigo 2000). He sought not only to ensure that the
cleanup is done right, but that the right cleanup is done (Olson 2000).
Olson's knowledge of the subject was his most important asset and proved to be invaluable in
many situations. His peers at EPA have described Olson as a "walking encyclopedia" on the
Pittsfield case (Bonarrigo 2000). Olson's command of the history and current information on the
topic made it impossible for GE to confuse or mislead Olson in meetings. When the community
attacked EPA in community meetings, Olson was able to calmly answer questions accurately and
defend EPA's actions. Although DeVillars was the final word on all major decisions due to his
authority as EPA Regional Administrator, he often looked to Olson for advice on how to
proceed. With the extensive demands of his position, DeVillars had to rely on Olson to get the
facts and reach a consensus with the other staff at EPA working on the case. His deep and
extensive knowledge on the case, as well as a commitment to continuously stay up to date on
developments, was the basis for a well-founded self-confidence.
The Pittsfield Mayor and co-worker Angela Bonarrigo describe Olson as a good listener.
Perhaps his listening skills contribute to his ability to understand people. Olson, more
importantly, understood the context of the problem and the environment of fear and confusion in
the community. His team and Bonarrigo's community outreach efforts helped towards involving
the citizens. For example, Bonarrigo went door to door with other EPA staff members to explain
EPA's position to Pittsfield residents and hear their feedback. EPA needed to force GE to
participate in the cleanup of Pittsfield, but providing many opportunities for citizens' voices to be
heard helped individuals feel as though their opinion did matter and that EPA wanted them to
feel safe and satisfied with the results (Bonarrigo 2000).
Not only was Olson capable of empathizing and understanding the residents because of his
emotional intelligence, but Olson also had personal experience. Not just experience working for
the EPA on such a large issue, but an experience similar to the Pittsfield residents. Olson grew
up in Woburn, Massachusetts, which is a former Superfund site (Olson 2000). Local industry in
Woburn polluted the area with TCE (trichloroethylene) which is also listed on the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)/EPA list of Top 20 Hazardous Substances
(along with PCBs). The International Agency for Research on Cancer (JARC), part of the World
Health Organization, lists TCE as chemicals that are "probably carcinogenic to humans." A
1997 report by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health concluded that "the relative risk
of developing childhood leukemia was greater for those children whose mothers were likely to
have consumed (contaminated well water in Woburn) during pregnancy" (Harvard 1999). While
growing up, six of Olson's childhood friends died of leukemia. Certainly, personal disclosure
about Olson's past experience as a Woburn resident helped dispel the idea that he might be a
removed, unfeeling "fed" (Olson 2001). In sum, Olson acted in a trustworthy manner, and in
doing so engendered trust in the process, even if public participation was ultimately minimal.
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Table 4.2 Success of public participation mechanisms used by the community groups.
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Communication Mechanisms Used by the Community Groups
The community groups were most effective at communicating with the community informally,
with the exception of HRR's student symposium. HRR focused on consensus building
communication. Their technique focused on communicating one-on-one with people and in
working groups at the student symposium. The communication function this community groups
served was gathering, compiling, and distributing the restoration consensus to the rest of the
community and the NDRC (Fletcher 2001).
HRI had the trust of the present and former blue-collar workers in the community, and these
individuals who had knowledge of off-site dumping areas confided in HRI. When HRI went
directly to the EPA and MA DEP with the information, the agencies did not always pay
attention. It was not until one member of HRI suggested establishing the phone line dedicated to
anonymous reports at the MA DEP that the agencies were able to fully appreciate the
information. For example, the Pittsfield dump was filled with almost one thousand barrels of
PCBs and PCB wastes. The story was that on Saturday afternoons, GE haulers would "borrow"
the keys to the dump, and bring their loads then. It took months of convincing to get the
agencies to spend the money on testing to check on these stories. By far, the majority of tips
have been correct (Gray 2001).
Capacity and Skill Building Mechanisms Used by the Community Groups
It has been three years, and the Housatonic River Initiative (HRI) has still not spent the entire
$50,000 grant they received from EPA. According to EPA Project Manager Bryan Olson, this is
frustrating. EPA chose HRI to receive the award because HRI was one of the most vocal
community groups, and EPA recognized that HRI served as a resource on the GE case for much
of the community. However, Tim Gray of HRI has indicated that the group fears spending all of
the money. They have heard of groups spending grant money too quickly, and then regretting
their expenses. These remorseful groups had inevitably learned of other uses for the money that
might have been more useful to the community. Trying to avoid these pitfalls, HRI held on to
almost half the grant for three years. They are planning on using the rest for a modeling project,
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similar to EPA's, to double-check the agency (Gray 2001). Gray and others realize that the
remediation proposals for the rest of the river depend on the results of this modeling study
(Consent Decree 2000). They would like to use the money to ensure that the modeling results
are as accurate as possible. After the group spends the money, they can apply for a renewal
through CERCLA. Even though the site was not listed on the NPL, a new rule, promulgated in
October 2000, allows sites that are proposed listings to be eligible for renewal (Olson 2001).
HRI is not taking any chances on not winning a renewal (Gray 2001).
Most of the grant money spent by HRI was on an epidemiological study of the City. These
results are not yet available, although the study began in 1998. Many members of the
community have been concerned with the potential health effects from the contamination, and
will be interested in the results (Gray 2001). Community members of the CCC have been
pushing for MA Department of Public Health and Safety to be more involved in the case
(Manasewich 2001). This outside epidemiological study may help to expedite a corresponding
government study.
The $10,000 technical assistance grant awarded to Get R.E.A.L. would have benefited the
residents and owners of fill properties, had they received it two years earlier. Although the grant
enabled the community to hire technical expertise, the grant came too late. The main concern the
residents wanted to address was the averaging of the fill properties. Unfortunately, over 80 sites
had already been completed, and it was too late for the Licensed Site Professional (LSP) to
change the scenario for future sites. Although the first grant resulted in little utility for the group
and the community, Get R.E.A.L. applied for and was awarded a second grant. This grant is
being used to fund work with a communications firm in Boston so the residents of the fill
properties could tell their story. The group had learned a considerable amount from talking to
people in Woburn, Massachusetts and in Connecticut who had lived on contaminated properties
and gone through this before, and they would like to record their experiences for the benefit of
future communities dealing with contamination (Orsi 2001).
HRR's use of their capacity building grants was very successful. The group used the money to
create public participation mechanisms, including meeting, home visits, and a symposium. The
group put together an extremely comprehensive and professional restoration plan for the
Housatonic River, incorporating input from over 1,000 individuals. The group sought to reach a
communitarian consensus, and succeeded. Whether or not the Natural Resource Damages
Council (NRDC) will adopt the plan to not remains to be seen (CCC Meeting 2001). The plan
includes short-term restoration plans and long-term stewardship goals. First, the community
recommends the establishment of an entity to oversee the comprehensive approach, separate
from the NRDC. Several people suggested that this entity should also provide technical
assistance and other services to enable other groups to accomplish projects, such as riverway
cleanups or school science projects. The main sections of the report are as follows: water quality
controls, a watershed management plan, educational programming, creating canoe access sites,
maintenance to ensure a navigable and safe river, establishing a "beaded necklace" approach,
ecological restoration and starting a River Guardian program to monitor the river, community-
based stewardship programs, and land acquisition (The Housatonic River Restoration Plan
1999).
HRR also planned and held a major student symposium. Over 400 individuals joined together,
including more than 250 students from first grade level to college, to brainstorm ideas for
restoration of the river and its stewardship. The group accomplished their goal to bring together
many different types of stakeholders to work together towards river restoration. Not only were
HRR's activities productive, but also the process was beneficial to the participants. Planning for
a clean, safe river made strides in restoring people's hopes for the future of the area (Fletcher
2001).
4.6.3 Analysis of the Citizen's Coordinating Council (CCC)
The CCC succeeds in serving as a vehicle for community involvement in the implementation of
the settlement agreement between GE and the government. All the local citizen groups
(H.E.A.L. is not a local group) are invited to sit at the table with representatives from GE and the
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government agencies overseeing the case. The mediation system ensures that a list of "action
items" is created at every meeting, and the mediator ensures that the items on the list are attended
to. The mediator's involvement takes the pressure off from the individuals present to pester
people for responses from month to month, serves as a communication device by providing
meeting notes, and helps ensure the accountability of all participants.
The meetings are held in a disabled-accessible room in the basement of the Pittsfield public
library. Translations into foreign languages or American Sign Language are not available, as
they do not seem necessary for anyone in attendance. Unfortunately, the meetings are always
held at the same time on the first Wednesday evening of every month. This makes it convenient
for the government officials and GE representatives for planning purposes, but prohibits
individuals who have a different standing commitment on Wednesday evenings from ever
attending. This compromises the CCC's goal to be "a mechanism to ensure that all parties to the
negotiated agreement are able to honor their commitment to listen to, to learn from, and
incorporate the ideas and concerns of the community to the greatest extent possible" (Consent
Decree 2000). Representatives from HRI are permitted to videotape all the meetings, and notes
from the meetings are posted on the EPA New England Internet Website.
A Group Left out of the Process: Connecticut Stakeholders
No final agreement was made with General Electric concerning remediation of the Housatonic
River for the stretch that begins two miles below the Pittsfield plant site. Connecticut residents
along the southern Housatonic River are concerned with the migration of the contaminants. In
the Consent Decree, EPA committed to perform a study of the rest of the river with computer
modeling technology. EPA will then propose a remediation plan to GE, which GE can accept or
appeal. They are worried that if PCBs are detected in Connecticut, it will be too late to force GE
to pay for remediation. Connecticut will receive some money from the NRD, and so far has
focused on posting signs to warn fisherpersons not to eat what they catch from the river.
One environmental group in Connecticut, H.E.A.L. (Housatonic Environmental Action League),
filed a motion to intervene against the Consent Decree. The court did not grant the intervention.
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Representatives from the group attend the monthly CCC meetings in Pittsfield to facilitate
communication with the Pittsfield community groups. To facilitate communication between the
community groups in Pittsfield and further downriver, the CCC voted to create a CCC Sub
Committee, which meets on a quarterly basis in Connecticut. The same Region One EPA
employees, including Bryan Olson, attend the CT meetings. GE has declined to send
representatives to the CT meetings, and they are not required to do so in the Consent Decree.
Like the CCC meetings, the CCC Sub Committee meetings are open to the public (Olson 2001).
4.7 Activities/Programs Enhancing Interagency Coordination
Interagency coordination can benefit the community by enabling the agencies to serve the
community better. Agencies can support one another in fighting against strong opposition and
avoid duplication of efforts. Good communication between the agencies helps the community by
providing consistent information. Trusted agencies can use their credibility with the community
to boost the credibility of a less-trusted agency through partnerships. The Ashford/Rest model
suggests five guidelines for interagency coordination:
1. Designated person(s) for interagency coordination at all levels of government
2. Federal interagency working groups
3. State or local interagency working groups
4. Multi-level interagency working groups
5. Establishment of formal administrative protocols for coordination
An interagency negotiation team was formed in Pittsfield in 1995, including representatives from
four federal and five state government agencies. A mechanism to communicate was set up,
including intergovernmental liaisons. The task force had regular meetings in order to approach
GE as a united front in the negotiations. EPA and MA DEP struggled over some jurisdictional
issues until it was determined that MA DEP would be in charge of managing the resident fill
properties and EPA would manage the remediation sites under the Consent Decree. The
agreement between the federal agency, ATSDR, and the Massachusetts Department of Public
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Health and Safety (DPH) represents another example of interagency coordination on the
Pittsfield case. Neither agency was involved in the negotiations. ATSDR is required by
CERCLA to do a health assessment on any site proposed to the NPL. The agency has a
cooperative agreement with the Massachusetts DPH, under which DPH is in the process of doing
the health assessment for ATSDR (Olson 2001).
CHAPTER 5. Conclusions
5.1 The Consent Decree and the Actions of the Trustees
In this case, government acted as a trustee on behalf of the public's interests in the negotiations.
EPA and the other government agencies worked hard to achieve a communitarian consensus of
the public through several public participation mechanisms. However, a utilitarian agreement
was reached by the agencies. Since the public was not allowed to take part in the negotiation
process, the public could not respond to the proposed Consent Decree until the end of the year-
long negotiation and the start of the public comment period. The public was at a serious
disadvantage, confronted with a several hundred page technical document with only sixty days to
respond. The agency did extend the public comment period on several occasions; however,
based on the constraints on public involvement it is likely that the agreement reflected the
agencies' opinions based on their assessment of the risks rather than on the community's
perception of the risks. GE had also solicited signatures from most local businesses in support of
the settlement, which was published in The Berkshire Eagle during the public comment period.
This unified message sent by this particular group of stakeholders had a strong impact
engendering a majority of community acceptance. The Consent Decree did not address the rest
of the river in a manner satisfactory to those located below the two-mile reach, and left citizens
living on the fill properties uncertain of their legal rights. The motions to intervene against the
Consent Decree and the over 50 lawsuits filed against GE are evidence of this confusion. Most
importantly however, the response actions delineated by the Consent Decree will create a far
safer environment for the contaminated community.
5.2 National Priorities Listing versus a Negotiated Settlement
The Pittsfield case is unique in that such an extensively polluted area was not listed on the NPL.
Often, the potentially responsible party has deserted the site, is not easily distinguishable from
other potentially responsible parties, or is unable to pay for the cleanup costs. General Electric
was the only major industry in the area, and could not contest its responsibility for the
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contamination. The company could have refused to negotiate, wasting even more of the federal
government's tax dollars on legal fees to fight GE in court. There are several criteria useful in
comparing which outcome was better than the other; however, weighing the criteria against one
another to determine which choice was better for the public does not give a clear answer. There
are several uncertainties in every case, and each person values each criterion differently. In table
5.1, the criteria are listed in the left-most column. These criteria have been adapted from the
cross case comparisons in the Ashford/Rest model. The comparisons are based on information
from studies of other Superfund site cleanups of similar size. In the boxes under the two choices,
listing the site on the NPL or negotiating a settlement, the two processes are compared with a +
or -. Since we can never know what would have happened if EPA had gone through with putting
Pittsfield on the NPL, these comparisons reflect the potential outcomes.
EPA, the lead federal agency on the case, had two main options. The agency could have chosen
to use the federal Superfund monies to begin a cleanup, and follow up by suing General Electric
under CERCLA for up to three times the cost of the cleanup. Instead, EPA favored negotiating
with GE to try to reach agreement on a cleanup, funded by both parties. The fact that GE was
the only potentially responsible party (PRP) made the negotiating possible. Had there been a
debate over who was responsible for the contamination, it would have been too complicated to
negotiate. GE refused to negotiate with the EPA unless members of the public were barred from
the negotiations and the individuals present were sworn to secrecy. However, according to
Bryan Olson, the Superfund process is not much more transparent. Both proposed remedies, via
Superfund or negotiation, would be subject to a public comment period of the same length.
Table 5.1 Which process is fairer? Which process achieves the "better" outcome?' 6
Criteria National Negotiated
Priorities List Settlement
Comprehensiveness and Quality of the
Remediation + +
Comprehensiveness and Quality of the
Restoration - +
Speed with which the Remediation took
place - +
Speed with which the Restoration should
take place - +
Cost of the Remediation to the Taxpayer
(more cost to taxpayer = "-") + -
Cost of the Restoration to the Taxpayer
(more cost to taxpayer = "-") ??
Amount of public funds spent on Legal Fees
Use of the Former GE plant site
Economic Redevelopment for Pittsfield
Fairness of Process
Fairness of Outcome
Stronger interpersonal relationships and
social fabric + -
Public involvement as a means to facilitate
continuous change + -
Community awareness, education, and
empowerment (mobilizing the entire + -
community)
Legitimacy of views and interests (possible
related to, but identical with respect) + -
Encouragement of discourse to facilitate both
shared understanding and shared values + -
Recourse for Future Problems at the Site
+?
16 For example, the author lists a "+" for "fairness of process" under NPL and a "-" under negotiated settlement.
This does not necessarily mean that the negotiated settlement was an unfair process, but that the author believes the
process to have been less fair than it might have been under the NPL.
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Risk to Human Health and the Environment
Since the negotiation process occurred outside of court, it is almost certain that the negotiated
settlement proceeded much more quickly than a NPL process for the site. Reducing the exposure
to PCBs as quickly as possible reduced the risks of exposure more quickly. However, new
research suggests the long-term effects of low-exposures can be just as devastating (Ashford
1991). Since the EPA officials on the case acted in a trustworthy manner, we must assume that
the cleanup they agreed to in the negotiated settlement was as thorough as that which they would
have expected to achieve through a listing on the NPL. The restoration process will undoubtedly
be completed faster with the negotiated settlement.
Those living on the Connecticut banks of the Housatonic River are left at a disadvantage because
of the relatively quick settlement. The negotiations were already extremely complex for the
Pittsfield plant and the first two miles of the contaminated portion of the river. More testing was
agreed to in the Consent Decree to determine the human health and environmental impacts of the
rest of the river, but the agreement leaves little leverage in negotiating a remediation of the rest
of the river with GE. Had the site been listed on the NPL, the agencies would not have had to
compromise on the potential cleanup of the rest of the river.
Fair and Just Process
Public Participation
Although the negotiation process facilitated a faster cleanup, the public has less time to gain the
knowledge needed to respond well because the process proceeded much more quickly. Since the
Consent Decree established the Citizen's Coordinating Council, the CCC had no input on the
remediation agreements contained in the Consent Decree. It was in GE's best interests to
complete the negotiation as quickly as possible. The company wanted to complete its official
responsibilities with the site and place as much distance as possible between connections among
the contamination and potential health effects. A faster resolution reduced the amount of time to
further investigate for past dumping sites. Already 80 properties had been remediated by the
time Get R.E.A.L. Pittsfield had heard of applying for technical assistance grants, done so, and
received the money to hire a LSP for consultation. Everyone wants a fast cleanup of a hazardous
problem, but when the remedies are complicated and various, it is unfair to rush people through.
Unlimited clear explanations cannot take the place of the time people need to digest and process
information.
Natural Resource Damages
The public may suffer from a low estimate for Natural Resource Damages. The calculation for
NRD is usually done after the cleanup has finished. Assessors examine the site, the riverbanks,
the river itself, etc. and estimate the costs to restore the natural conditions. The statute of
limitations to change this amount normally runs out for the Natural Resource Damages Council
three years after the site is removed from the NPL.17 In this case, in order to wrap up the case
sooner, the government assessors reviewed the plans for the extent of the remediation and
estimated a number to repair the damage the remediation would cause before many of the
remediation projects had even begun. With the negotiated settlement, the statute of limitations
will run out three years after the trustees received the dollar amount of the damages, regardless
of the condition of the remediation the site and other affected areas. There is no recourse
available to the trustee after the three years (Fletcher 2001).
Grants for the Community
Under CERCLA, NPL sites are eligible for $50,000 Technical Assistance Grants (TAG), which
are awarded to a community group concerned with the Superfund site were renewable annually
in $50,000 increments. A new rule, promulgated Oct. 2, 2000 at 40 CFR Part 35, increased
flexibility by no longer requiring the renewal be in $50,000 increments, but also by making no
distinction between a proposed listing and a final listing. Under the previous rule, only
communities with a site that has established a final listing on the NPL were allowed renewal of
the TAG. Since 1990, proposed sites are also eligible (Olson 2001). Therefore no difference
ultimately exists for the site's eligibility for government assistance with regards to skill
17 A site cannot be removed from the NPL until EPA determines that no further response is needed to protect human
health or the environment. The Regional Administrator must approve a "close-out report" that establishes that all
appropriate response actions have been taken or that no action is required (EPA 2001).
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development in the community. Hopefully, HRI will be able to apply for a renewal of its TAG
after the original grant has been spent.
Best Use of Tax Dollars
When Superfund monies are used to perform a cleanup and the potentially responsible parties are
sued in court, often, a settlement is reached. According to DeVillars, rarely are all the costs
recovered. Thus, it is difficult to determine exactly how much of the one and one-half mile
stretch of river cleanup would have been paid for with federal dollars had the site been listed on
the NPL. In the Consent Decree, GE committed to spending $33 Million on this portion of the
river, and EPA agreed to pay the rest, which is estimated at $12 Million. Unfortunately, most
projects overrun their estimated costs, and the EPA will be left holding the bill. However, a
benefit to the negotiated settlement was the amount of legal fees saved by the agencies.' 8
Economic Recovery
The economic recovery of the region should be greatly improved by the economic aid provided
by GE. The unprecedented reuse of the GE buildings will make commercial space available
much more quickly than rebuilding after the Superfund process would be complete. In the case
of economic redevelopment, GE's desire to wrap up the Pittsfield case is an advantage. The
company has committed $50 Million to redevelop the site for the City's use, and provided $10
Million in direct aid (EPA 2001). Historically, it is unlikely that the responsible party would
offer these redevelopment funds through the Superfund process.
Human Impact
Although EPA may, through the settlement, have achieved a level of cleanup equivalent to the
cleanup possible through Superfund, many community members (especially those in the activist
groups) feel suspect of that fact. These individuals felt rushed through the process, with hardly
18 According to William Shutkin, Professor of Urban Studies and Planning at MIT, 75% of the money spent on
Superfund sites has been on the legal fees, not the cleanups (Shutkin 2001).
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enough time to understand the impacts of the site and the remediation, let alone respond. They
also disliked the fact that GE told the agencies that the public had to be left out of the process to
negotiate, and the agencies agreed. Government agencies exist to serve the public, and the
public does not feel well served when they are excluded. Although EPA made, in some
instances, heroic efforts to communicate with the community about the site, they could not make
up for "keeping the negotiations secret."
Summary
In conclusion, the negotiation process resulted in several positive impacts on the community, but
could have been improved. Better public participation could be achieved with community
involvement in the negotiations and more time for the public to digest the information.
Unfortunately, both involving the community and a drawn out negotiation would be strong
detractors for a company to negotiate. Under those stipulations, for example, GE would have
refused to participate in negotiations. Moreover, the company threatened to use its extensive
resources to extend a court battle for as long as possible, and promised to discredit the science
indicating PCBs are hazardous. However, for a fair and just solution, the community as a whole
must be represented in the decision-making process if choices between economic viability and
future health impacts might be made.
5.3 Value Added by Public Participation in Pittsfield
The greatest impact public participation had on the Pittsfield case was by helping to identify off-
site contamination. By passing on information through word of mouth and through the toll free
phone line established by the MA DEP, the public identified all the residential fill sites and many
other large areas of contamination in town. Interviewing ex-employees provided valuable
historical information about GE's past industrial practices on the site. The community groups
had the greatest impact outreaching to other members in the community and educating them
about the process happening with the agencies as well as the information the groups collected on
health risks, remediation options, etc.
A second valuable contribution was HRI's indirect impact on the negotiations. According to
DeVillars, HRI's outspoken environmental position enabled EPA to gain some leverage with GE
in the negotiations. GE understood that it was EPA's responsibility to act on behalf of the
public, and HRI helped paint a picture of a more concerned community than actually existed.
Although the level of concern expressed by members of HRI is not representative of the entire
community, the agreement required compromises on the part of both parties, and the agreement
reached by EPA was less stringent than HRI would have liked. The result is probably closer to
what the public wanted that it would have been without the voices of HRI. The dissatisfaction of
HRI and some of the other community groups is an indicator of the utilitarian consensus reached
by the agency.
An important turning point in the case occurred when The Berkshire Eagle published a letter in
favor of the settlement signed by many CEO's of local businesses. GE gathered the signatures in
a concerted effort to build consensus with the main economic players in the region, including the
PEDA and local businesses, and paid to post the page in the newspaper. The EPA received
many letters during the public comment period from these stakeholders, urging EPA to accept
the agreement. According to Mayor Doyle, a finalized listing on the NPL would devastate the
community. People feared the area would become an economic wasteland because nobody
would want to risk exposure to contamination by visiting the area. It was at this time that the
tone of The Berkshire Eagle, previously sympathetic to the environmentalist point of view,
changed permanently to favor a settlement with GE.
It is unknown whether or not these members of the business community are aware of the hazards
posed by the extent of the contamination that will remain after the cleanup. It can be difficult,
while enjoying the view of the Housatonic River in the beautiful setting of the Berkshires, to
believe that interacting with this environment could cause serious health impacts. The presence
of PCBs is unnoticeable to the human senses, unlike the stench of raw sewage leaks, the
difficulty breathing while near busy roads, or the hazy views caused by smog. In the case of
contamination that is more offensive to the senses, it is in the interests of the economic
stakeholders to cleanup the problem as best as possible because they cannot hide the problem.
PCBs are only made visible through press releases or other public announcements.
5.4 Missed Opportunities for Public Participation in Pittsfield
The emergence of several community groups in a short period of time, concentrated around the
negotiations, is an indicator that there were failures in the system. Had the public been confident
in the process of reaching a remedy, they would not have made the choice to devote all their
spare time to researching toxic chemicals and picketing the GE site. The closed negotiation set
very real limits on the potential for public participation. Despite communicating with the public
outside the negotiations, a feeling of powerlessness prevailed among many members of the
community. EPA and the other agencies made strides to involve the public; however, there were
some missed opportunities.
Not all the mechanisms were available to all members of the community. More attention needs
to be paid to meeting times, location, and childcare. Home visits by Olson and Bonarrigo on
behalf of EPA certainly helped, but the ability to hear the other thoughts within the community at
meetings or through newsletter summaries of public meetings would be helpful.
The agencies need to be more conscious of the "divide and conquer" strategy often employed by
industry against environmentalists. The formation of separate community groups concerned with
the river, the remediating of the site, the fill properties, and the allocation/spending of NRD
weakened the overall impact of the community organizing and resulted in the duplication of
some efforts. The formation of the CCC after the Consent Decree was ratified did not help these
groups unite during the critical stages of the agreement. Just as the agencies had an
intergovernmental panel, the agency could have facilitated an intercommunity group panel.
The agencies could have paid more attention to helping the public ask questions. Members of
Get R.E.A.L. commented on how helpful it was for them to listen to a speaker they invited, the
lawyer from the Woburn contamination case. If the agencies cannot provide contacts to other
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contaminated communities themselves, they should provide the community with the idea and
some possible contacts. Questions about technical assistance grants, choice of the remediation
contractor, or a community observer for the negotiations did not come up until too late. For
example, Get R.E.A.L. had many concerns regarding the fill properties. Most members were not
equipped to understand the technical environmental impact statements on the fill properties.
They were extremely dissatisfied with the practice adopted part way through the remediation of
these hundreds of properties to average the concentration of PCBs in the soil.
A secondary concern was the quality of the restoration. Some residents complained that they did
not receive enough topsoil to grow grass. All the water would quickly seep through the thin
layer and descend through the sand used to refill the site, leaving the grass seed sitting on top, in
conditions too dry to grow. Large, historic trees were replaced with seedlings. Residents who
wanted to put off the remediation of the fill property until these concerns were resolved were told
by MA DEP that if they did not sign the Access Agreements, that the DEP would pursue the
owner themselves to cleanup the property. Contaminated communities need legal assistance in
interpreting such documents as Access Agreements and the Consent Decree, and should not be
forced to pay for it on their own.
Residents did not understand the Access Agreements they were required to sign to allow for
testing, remediation, and restoration of their fill property. When problems began to occur, such
as a truck driving over a sewer line on a property and breaking it open, residents did not have
recourse. These accidents were not provided for in the Access Agreements; MA DEP did not
have the money to pay and GE was not accountable according to the document. Over time, trial
and error experienced by the victims created some knowledge sharing through Get R.E.A.L.
However, it is unfair that these fill property residents were victimized twice: first, with the
original contamination and second, by a lesser restoration. EPA provided some support to the
fill property residents, but the fill properties were officially under MA DEP jurisdiction. These
mishaps underline the need for improved communication within a community, and a deliberate,
fair process.
The creation of the CCC after GE and the agencies already agreed to the major remediation plans
for Pittsfield undermined the community's trust in the agency. The state mediator stated that the
CCC was "not designed to affect the process, but to understand and communicate about it."
While an extremely useful communication tool, the CCC meetings could also be an opportunity
for the agency to involve the public.
5.5 The Adequacy of the Ashford/Rest Model in Analyzing the
Pittsfield Case
The Ashford/Rest model provides a comprehensive analysis for examining the effectiveness of
public participation in contaminated communities. The model extracts the essence of all the
major literature on public participation and synthesizes it into a complex diagnostic tool,
applicable to real world scenarios. The model makes meaningful analysis possible by providing
a measure for comparison. The model provides the questions about the process that the
contaminated communities themselves would benefit from asking during the process. This
suggests that the community should be involved in ongoing evaluation of the participation
mechanisms used by the agencies and community groups. Providing a legal advisor, paid to help
the community interpret legal documents (such as the Consent Decree), is one mechanism not
specifically mentioned under skills and capacity building.
The Ashford/Rest model discusses several vehicles for public participation, focusing on those
that create broad-based outreach, communication, and education of the community, build skills
and capability in the community, and provide for increased community participation in, and
access to, government decisions. In the Pittsfield case, the community was barred from
participating in the negotiation process due to GE's stipulations. The model does not specifically
address industry's involvement in the public participation process. GE's involvement was
extremely critical in this case, because the agencies were not just fighting industry in court. The
agencies were trying to work with GE, to reach an agreement, taking into consideration both
party's goals: EPA's goal to achieve the best environmental cleanup possible, and GE's goal to
spend as little money as possible. The model also does not incorporate a tool to compare
negotiated settlements such as in Pittsfield with Superfund cases. The section on cross-
comparing Superfund cases is adaptable for this purpose, but probably not comprehensive in
these special cases.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ACOE - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Appendix S - the confidentiality agreement signed by the negotiating parties (part of CD)
Appendix T - part of the CD that lists the addresses for the resident fill properties
ATSDR - Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
BNR - Bureau of Natural Resources
CAA - Clean Air Act
CAB - Citizen Advisory Board
CAG - Citizen Advisory Group
CAP - Citizen Advisory Panel
CCC - Citizen's Coordinating Council
CD - Consent Decree
CERCLA - Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
CNS - covenant not to sue
CT AGO - Connecticut Attorney General's Office
CT DEP - Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection
CWA - Clean Water Act of 1948
DOD - U.S. Department of Defense
DOI - U.S. Department of Interior
DOJ - U.S. Department of Justice
DPH - Massachusetts Department of Public Health
EOEA - Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
EPA - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EREs - Environmental Restrictions and Easements
GAO - U.S. General Accounting Office
GE - General Electric, Inc.
H.E.A.L. - Housatonic Environmental Action League
HRI - Housatonic River Initiative
HRR - Housatonic River Restoration, Inc.
HVA - Housatonic River Valley Association
HWSA - Hazardous Substances Waste Act of 1984
IARC - International Agency for Research on Cancer, part of the World Health Organization
LSP - Licensed Site Professional
MA AGO - Massachusetts Attorney General's Office
MA DEP - Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
MGL - Massachusetts General Laws
NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NPL - National Priorities List (established by CERCLA)
NRD - Natural Resource Damages
NRDC - Natural Resource Damages Council
PCBs - polychlorinated biphenyls
PEDA - Pittsfield Economic Development Authority
ppm - parts per million
PRP - Potentially Responsible Party
R.E.A.L. - Residents Environmental Action League
RAO - Response Action Outcome
RCRA - Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
SARA - Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
Superfund - refers to CERCLA and SARA legislation, as well as the fund created by CERCLA
SWDA - Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965
TCE - trichloroethylene
TSCA - Toxic Substances and Control Act of 1976
USGS - United States Geological Survey
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APPENDIX A. Main Outline for the Consent Decree
The Pittsfield Remediation Plan:
Currently in Pittsfield, EPA New England is overseeing remediation of the Housatonic River and
related land areas. The plan does not outline the use of any of the above mentioned remediation
techniques. The decision-makers drew up a remediation strategy that uses such procedures such
as soil removal and replacement, habitat restoration, placement of infiltration barriers, capping of
various areas, including the 26 acre bottom of Silver Lake and an industrial landfill, re-routing of
a brook and comprehensive groundwater monitoring. The residential homes with contaminated
lots have been excavated and replaced with "clean" dirt. The river oxbows, Allendale schoolyard
and GE site are in the remediation process or have finished. The following is an outline for part
of the ratified Consent Decree:
1. Cleanup of Specific Areas
a. Agreement Scope
b. Management Principles for the Cleanup
c. Areas
i. GE Plant Site
ii. Former Oxbow Areas
iii. Allendale School
iv. Housatonic River Floodplain (residential and non-residential)
v. Silver Lake
vi. Housatonic River (3 sections)
2. Brownfields Redevelopment and Economic Aid
3. Restoration of Natural Resources
a. Direct Action funded by GE
b. Compensatory Action by GE
c. GE funding of other efforts
4. Recovery of Government Costs
5. Form and Effect of the Consent Decree
6. Enhanced Public Participation
a. Management Architecture
b. Citizen's Coordinating Council
The following is the scope of the Consent Decree regarding the cleanup of contaminated areas
and eight management principles for those cleanups.
I. Cleanup of Contaminated Areas
A. Scope of the Consent Decree
This agreement covers the GE Plant Site, including Silver Lake and Unkamet Brook, the
former oxbows (including Newell Street commercial properties), the Housatonic River
sediments, banks, and floodplain properties downstream of the GE Plant Site, and the
Allendale School. With the exception of the residential properties within the former
oxbows, this agreement does not cover cleanup of residential properties in Pittsfield or
elsewhere that received GE wastes for use as fill. These properties are covered by a
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separate Administrative Consent Order between Massachusetts and GE. More than 100
residential fill properties will have been cleaned up by the end of the 1999 construction
season. Residential fill properties remain a high priority and will continue on an
expedited sampling and cleanup schedule.
B. Overall Principles for Management of the Cleanup
1. Extensive sampling on GE and non-GE owned properties. Agencies to oversee
all GE work and reserve the right to conduct additional sampling if necessary.
2. GE to perform cleanups except on 1 2 Mile Reach of Housatonic River.
3. Material and debris excavated from areas subject to this Consent Decree,
excluding the River below two miles, are to be consolidated on the GE facility
subject to the following:
a. No disposal of regulated TSCA waste or RCRA hazardous waste in the
Hill 78 Consolidation Area.
b. No on-site disposal of drums, capacitors, equipment, free product or
asbestos required to be removed as part of the building demolition.
c. Area and height limitations of the consolidation areas as follows: Hill
78- 5.6 acre footprint and 1,050 foot maximum elevation, Building 71- 4.4
acre footprint and 1,048 foot maximum elevation, Merrill Road/New York
Ave- 1.6 acre footprint and 1,027 foot maximum elevation. Elevation is
based on National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD). For reference
purposes, current elevation of the top of Hill 78 (including the material
from the Allendale School, as described in Item I.C.3) is 1049 feet.
d. Capping and long-term monitoring of consolidation units.
e. Building demolition debris, following the removal of asbestos, may also
be consolidated within the existing foundations of certain buildings.
4. Environmental Restrictions and Easements (EREs) are to be placed on all
GE-owned properties to ensure that current uses will not change (i.e.,
commercial/industrial properties will continue to be used as commercial/industrial
properties and recreational properties will continue to be used as recreational
properties) and to protect the integrity of the cleanup.
5. Two options for non-GE owned properties: a) cleanup that is protective of
current use with Environmental Restrictions and Easements (EREs) utilized, with
consent of the owner, to maintain current use, or b) a conditional solution which
also provides a cleanup that is protective of current use but, instead of EREs,
requires additional cleanup if the use of the property changes.
6. Fully cooperative approach to management of cleanup activities.
7. The parties have established a management architecture for project
implementation involving EPA, state regulatory agencies, GE, and, as
appropriate, PEDA, the City and the Trustees to ensure that all aspects of the
project are managed in a fully collaborative and cooperative manner, to plan work
and to cooperatively head off problems and disputes before they arise.
8. Public to provide input throughout implementation of the work.
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The following is an excerpt from the ratified Consent Decree for soil remediation on the General
Electric plant site:
"A. GE Plant Site
Objective: To remediate surface soils to levels that allow for commercial/industrial or
recreational use, and to minimize exposure to contaminants in deeper soils.
1. Remediation required for PCBs greater than 25 ppm average in superficial soils (0-1
feet).
2. An engineered barrier to minimize infiltration and prevent exposure will be
implemented in areas where PCBs greater than 100 ppm average are within the top 15
feet.
3. Remediation required for PCBs greater than 200 ppm average from 1-6 feet.
4. New or repaired utility corridors will be backfilled with soils that contain no more
than 25 ppm PCBs.
5. No capping of unpaved soils in floodplain. Soil removal and replacement is required
instead to avoid loss of flood storage capacity.
6. Removal of pavement in 200-foot-wide buffer zone on northern (plant) side of River
between the location of the former Thermal Oxidizer and the downstream boundary of
the GE facility to provide enhanced habitat restoration and to reduce storm water
runoff.
7. Future City of Pittsfield baseball field will include a one-foot cap in addition to
achieving the recreational standard of 15 ppm PCBs average in the next 2 feet.
B. Unkamet Brook and Floodplain Remediation
Objective: To provide protection for human recreational users and biological receptors in the
portions of the Brook and its floodplain from Dalton Avenue downstream to the Housatonic
River.
1. Reroute Unkamet Brook to its former channel and cap entire existing industrial
landfill.
2. Remove Brook sediments and remediate inundated wetland sediments to achieve 1
ppm PCBs average in surface sediments.
3. Remove soils in Unkamet Brook recreational floodplain to achieve 10 ppm PCBs
average in top foot and 15 ppm in 1-3 foot depth.
C. Hill 78 and Building 71 Consolidation Areas
Objective: To eliminate risk of exposure to materials in the consolidation units through a
combination of engineering controls and long-term monitoring.
1. Install a protective cap over Hill 78 and Building 71 Consolidation Areas.
2. Establish an extensive groundwater monitoring system to monitor the groundwater
surrounding the landfill.
3. Install a liner and leachate collection system for Building 71 Consolidation Area.
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4. Design both areas with human health and environmental protection, as well as
configuration limitations, in mind.
5. An additional area at New York Ave/Merrill Road may be utilized and will be
designed in a similar manner to the Building 71 Consolidation Area.
D. Silver Lake
Objective: to provide a clean-up that is protective of human and ecological use of the lake.
1. Remove bank soils at non-residential properties to achieve no more than 10 ppm PCBs
average in top foot and 15 ppm PCBs average at 1-3 feet, assuming EREs are
executed. If no EREs, a conditional solution will be implemented for bank soils that
will achieve 10 ppm PCBs average in top 3 feet and meet the other requirements for
conditional solutions in Item C.1.d.(ii) above. On residential properties, GE will
achieve a 2 ppm PCBs average.
2. Remove and replace hot spot sediments near the outfall.
3. Cap the entire 26 acre lake bottom and armor the entire perimeter of lake; specific
design plans to be approved in the future by EPA.
4. Perform periodic review of effectiveness of cap. If performance standards for cap are
not met, additional actions will be evaluated and implemented."
(Taken directly from the GE Pittsfield Consent Decree, ratified October 2000.)
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APPENDIX B. Citizens For PCB Removal Reacts To PCB
Consent Decree
Letter to EPA & Justice Dept. by Charles & Barbara Cianfarini and Dorothy Mara
(Citizens for PCB Removal Comment Committee)
Citizens for PCB Removal believes that PCBs are harmful to public health. Not only are they
probable carcinogens, but also they have been proven to be hormone disrupters and can cause
lower IQs. The studies reaching these conclusions are not limited to the United States. Most of
the world has banned the use of PCBs and we believe that these chemicals must be removed
from our environment. Citizens for PCB Removal ("CPR") believes any settlement concerning
PCB and other contamination in Pittsfield and Berkshire County, Massachusetts must
accomplish a few basic goals: 1) it must provide for a thorough cleanup; 2) it must leave open
options for dealing with future problems when they arise; 3) it must not balance the settlement on
the backs of innocent property owners and taxpayers. The Consent Decree and the appended
work plans are a good start to accomplishing a thorough cleanup; but are just that - a beginning.
The Consent Decree is lacking in many ways. Our comments are informal, not technical, but
state our passionate belief that the Consent Decree needs modification.
1. The settlement burdens innocent property owners in a way that is not in the public interest.
The Consent Decree ("CD") contains 68 pages of cross covenants not to sue and grants of
distribution protection which protect the United States government and the government of
Massachusetts and Connecticut and the defendant, General Electric, while leaving all other
property owners who own land containing General Electric fill or which was contaminated by a
river exposed to potential future liability. Those owners are not only innocent of any role in
causing the pollution, but have already been victimized by it. Leaving them exposed to future
liability while letting General Electric off the hook is not in the public interest. The CD
provides, in paragraph 189, that all parties to the CD preserve all their rights against all others
not parties to it. Thus innocent property owners may be held liable under CERCLA or MGL c.
21E, for future problems caused by General Electric's pollution. While the law may allow
liability to be imposed on innocent property owners, it is our understanding that the public policy
behind the law seeks to ensure that there is some party available who can be held responsible for
cleaning up the pollution. The need to hold someone liable, even an innocent someone, simply
does not apply here. This is not a case where the polluter is unknown, or is bankrupt, or whose
assets are for some other reason unavailable for cleanup. The polluter here is a party to this
agreement and is not only solvent but in fact is one of the wealthiest companies in the world. A
policy designed to ensure that funds are available to cleanup pollution is not served by shifting
the future burden from a wealthy culpable defendant to innocent persons with vastly fewer
resources. The potential for future liability is very real. Many properties are being cleaned only
to a depth of a few feet. Deeper contamination is not being addressed. Particularly for the
"oxbow properties" (see #7) which are filled to a depth of as much as 20 plus feet and which
have not been thoroughly tested, the potential exists for future releases that could impact the
river. Liability for that cleanup, should it be needed, should not fall on the property owners. If
the plaintiff government agencies are confident that the solution they have agreed upon is indeed
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protective of public health and safety for the long term, they should, in this CD or an appended
document, grant immunity from future liability to all contaminated property owners. In addition,
in paragraph 189, the CD specifically sites the right of contribution as one of the rights reserved
by the parties against all others. Moreover, in paragraphs 194 and 195, the CD grants to the State
of Massachusetts and the City of Pittsfield, the same contribution protection it grants to General
Electric, should those entities acquire an interest in land that is the subject of this CD.
Government agencies entered into negotiations that did not permit other interested parties to
participate, then secured for themselves protection from liability while specifically preserving the
potential for future liability of innocent property owners who were not allowed to participate. If
forced to fund a cleanup under CERLA or MGL c.21, these property owners could not then seek
contribution from General Electric. General Electric, however, can still seek contribution from
them. Defending oneself is expensive; and where, as here, the polluter is being exonerated from
future liability, there is no need for them to retain a right to contribution.
2. The Consent Decree does not appear to leave the agencies the flexibility they need to deal
with inadequate cleanups or subsequent recontamination of residential and commercial
properties. One of our longstanding concerns has been the use of widespread discrete testing to
investigate fill that could have been deposited in very small areas but with high concentrations,
and at shallow depths with clean material above. Our concerns have been borne out on two
properties where homeowners, after their properties were "remediated," have found transformer
parts while digging holes to plant shrubs or erect clothesline poles. CPR has, on several
occasions, asked what will be done in these situations, in terms or retesting or further
remediation and has never received an answer. We would like one now. Do the CD and the
Administrative Consent Order (ACO) prevent the government agencies from taking
administrative action on those properties ever again or would the post remediation discovery of
evidence of contamination allow further investigation and cleanup? If further action against
General Electric is completely foreclosed, then once again the settlement less the culpable party
off the hook and shifts the burden to the innocent property owner in a way that is not in the
public interest. Furthermore, for properties along the water bodies, Silver Lake, Goodrich Pond,
Unkamet Brook and the Housatonic River, the CD and the ACO appear to preclude cleanup of
recontamination. Again this shifts the burden of cleanup to innocent property owners who are
unlikely to have the resources to undertake a cleanup while absolving the wealthy polluter. This
is particularly problematic for properties along Silver Lake because the remedy selected for the
Lake itself is suspect (see #8 below).
3. The liability relief granted to General Electric is unreasonably broad. The General Electric
facility contains a vast number of chemical contaminants in, on and under the entire site. There is
much more than PCB contamination to be addressed: Dioxin, Trichloroethylene, Benzene, and
Toluene, to name a few, are documented as present. Much of this contamination will be here
forever because of the agreement to "cap" some of the most contaminated locations and turn
them over to PEDA, as well as to leave Hill 78 in place. Under the CD, it appears General
Electric will never be liable for cleanup of these areas in the future, even if they are impacting
the river or may be found to be a greater health risk in the future than they are considered to be
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today, and even though GE will do no cleanup initially. Since one of the primary arguments in
favor of the CD seems to be that funding the cleanup could be problematic if we have to rely on
government resources, we are concerned that the CD will put our community in the future
position of being recontaminated and without the resources to cleanup. A grant of immunity
from future liability for areas that are not being cleaned is overly generous and not in the
interests of our community.
4. The Hill 78 Landfill poses an unacceptable risk. One of the elements of the proposed
Settlement between EPA and GE that is most disturbing and unpalatable is the plan to locate a
toxic waste dump IN THE MIDDLE of our city: surrounded by an elementary school, family
neighborhoods, retail businesses, industries including the potentially volatile US Generating
plant, Silver Lake, Goodrich Pond, Unkamet Brook, and our long-suffering river! The EPA and
(MA) DEP have not conducted a thorough investigation of the contents of the General Electric
landfill known as Hill 78; instead they propose to cap this landfill without ever obtaining that
information. While the cap will be an improvement of the existing situation, it leaves an
unacceptable risk. This landfill is not lined. There is apparently no paper trail to indicate what
was disposed of in there. Without knowing what the landfill contains, EPA and DEP cannot
possibly assess the impact of this solution's failure. They do not know what contaminates might
be released or what impact those releases could have. While the agencies believe an "early
warning" system of test wells provides adequate protection, we are well aware of other areas
where the agencies were confident the existing array of test wells and borings provided adequate
information, but were subsequently proven wrong. For example: 1) The plume under the Newell
street parking lot was not discovered through early and fairly comprehensive testing; it took
further investigation of a type that will not be performed on Hill 78 to locate the plume; 2) The
plumes on the residential side of Newell Street were not discovered through initial testing; we
were given repeated assurances that testing had been done and there was nothing to worry about;
3) Tests at the Pittsfield Municipal Landfill revealed nothing of concern, but a bulldozer
attempting to cap the landfill uncovered barrels of toxic waste; a discovery that has yielded over
800 barrels of GE associated waste; 4) Dorothy Amos Park was tested and cleaned and found not
to be impacting the river; had it not been for testing to attempt to establish background levels, the
hot spot in the river next to the park would not have been located. The cap over Hill 78 and the
test wells around it are not an adequate solution for a landfill adjacent to an elementary school
and a residential neighborhood and which could potentially impact a "cleaned" river in the
future. The worst part about this is that it will be designated as a "permanent" solution. Despite
man's best efforts, the evidence that Mother Nature is relentless in her ability to destroy whatever
man creates is all around us. Every homeowner knows the struggle it takes to keep one's property
in good repair, especially the parts exposed to the harsh New England winters. Every gardener
marvels at how the earth constantly changes, moves, evolves; rocks reappear yearly in
flowerbeds that have been meticulously stripped of such. Roads and bridges crumble, majestic
trees are felled, and monuments wear away. Even in this area we are not immune to tornadoes,
hurricanes, even the occasional earthquake. The forces of nature are ongoing, permanent;
landfills, dumps - 'though they may be humans' "state of the art" - are, at best temporary.
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5. The Building 71 containment area is not an acceptable long-term solution for ridding our
community of contamination when treatment is not only possible but also feasible from a cost
perspective for this defendant. The CD also provides for a separate, lined landfill adjacent to
Hill 78, known as Building 71 containment area. It will house higher levels of know PCB
contamination. Not only have there been problems with other containment facilities in places
such as North Carolina and Colorado where failures have occurred within two years of their
construction, but also there are current technologies available that remove contamination from
sediment, leaving clean sediment and allowing the contamination to be destroyed. We have a
local business that has cleaned PCBs from other sites around this county. It has been estimated
that treatment of PCB contaminated material in this case would cost about 40 million dollars. In
fact, it is less than half of what General Electric paid Jack Welch in salary and bonuses ($87
million) for 1999 alone. Clearly treatment is a feasible option for this defendant. Construction of
the Building 71 facility, if it expedited the cleanup of Allendale School, was justifiable as a
short-term option, but treatment should be evaluated, and periodically reevaluated as the long-
term solution. We plead that the decree be changed to name these facilities as temporary and
that a final time limit be set on the complete treatment of the waste contained therein. While we
prefer immediate treatment, a maximum time limit should not exceed thirty years.
6. The cleanup options offered to the commercial property owners are inadequate and insulting.
At public and other meetings with EPA and DEP, commercial property owners were promised
repeatedly that the agencies would support their needs even though they themselves were
excluded from the negotiations. But the CD gives these owners only two options, neither of
which allows them to operate their business without the cloud of contamination impacting their
operations. Neither option will allow them to engage in future construction or expansion without
finding themselves in negotiations with General Electric and the regulatory agencies.
Furthermore, while the banking community has pronounced itself more comfortable with the
idea of lending money to these property owners, assurances that PCB contamination will not
effect lending in the future have not been forthcoming. These property owners still may not be
able to grow, alter or sell their business in the future. We are not proposing specific solutions to
this problem, but instead insist that this portion of the CD be reconsidered in a process that
includes the affected property owners.
7. Better investigation and cleanup of the "oxbows" is needed to protect the river from the risk
or recontamination. Along the river in several places, are areas called "the oxbows," which were
filled with General Electric facility "material" by the Army Corps of Engineers in the 1930's and
'40's in an effort to straighten the flow of the river and reduce widespread area flooding. Again
there is no paper trail of what materials were actually placed in these oxbows, but PCB laden
fluids have been discovered and are being pumped from one of the oxbow areas. We ask for a
complete investigation of these oxbows and that all cleanup options be considered, including
treatment and removal. It is not logical to spend millions cleaning the river and flood plain
properties and then leave them subject to potential recontamination because known areas of fill
were not properly explored.
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8. The proposed solution for cleaning Silver Lake is not credible. The proposed remedy for the
multi-contaminated Silver Lake, as we understand it, is to place a sand cap on the bottom of the
lake. We are not aware of any engineering to back up that proposal. From a layperson's
perspective, however, we cannot believe that a sand containment layer can prevent
recontamination of a spring fed lake while 3 layers of plastic liner are needed to keep
contaminated particles from filtering up into the river.
9. Natural Resource damages are unreasonably low. The report by Industrial Economics
estimated the maximum probable natural resource damages at well over 200 million dollars. The
government has asserted that the uncertainty involved in proving those damages justifies settling
for a reduced amount. It does not justify settling for approximately 10% to 12% of that amount.
10. The extent (lack) of cleanup is based upon possible overly optimistic science. As stated in
our opening paragraph, CPR believes PCB's and the other contaminants found with the PCB's are
a substantial health risk, as does EPA and DEP. However, standards and levels of cleanup,
including decisions of how deep to excavate, levels of ppms in soil, water, and air, and even the
concept of "averaging" levels of contamination to varying amounts dependent on usage are based
upon a very complex science called "risk assessment." Our objections to many of the risk
assessment conclusions are based upon the concept of environmental and human blood serum
"background levels." We question whether the background levels cited for this settlement are a
valid standard for this state, country and the world, in general, or are they higher and specific to
what is "normal" in this area, in particular, based upon the long term, widespread contamination
throughout Berkshire County and adjacent areas specifically from the General Electric plant.
Numerous world wide studies support these suspicions, as well as evidence that even very low
levels of contamination pose serious threats to the safety and well-being of certain populations,
in particular the unborn and very young, most notably in the areas of hormone disruption,
intelligence, behavior and learning capabilities. We suspect a long-anticipated study by an Expert
Panel commissioned by the Mass Department of Public Health which we believe will confirm
these health threats and will outline further toxin dangers has been inexplicably delayed beyond
this CD Comment deadline. This Settlement should not be confirmed without this further
scientific data and unless the calculations upon which it is based are verified, confirmed and
validated as reasonable by recent and ongoing world-wide research.
11. The Citizen Coordinating Council has not enhanced citizen participation and the existence of
that body should not influence the review of this settlement. Interested citizens groups were
invite to participate in an enhanced public participation process through the Citizens
Coordinating Council. The council has not enhanced participation, and in retrospect, its failure
should have been anticipated. For many months the council meetings proceeded in the following
fashion: a public member would make a comment which might be picked up on by some other
public member but EPA, DEP or General Electric would not respond because they were bound
by confidentiality rules of the ongoing negotiation. Clearly, a forum to enhance communication
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cannot succeed where the parties who are charged with determining the solution are precluded
from communicating. In addition, the single productive session of the council, concerning the
remediation of the first half mile of the river, demonstrated strong opposition to a plastic lines
being used in the river and that opposition was backed up by an expert from the Army Corp of
Engineers who deemed it unnecessary. However, when the revised plan for the river was
published it provide for not 1 but 3 layers of plastic lines. The public's concerns had been
discounted without explanation and were clearly no more effective than if they had been made in
writing and hadn't had expert support. In fact, because members of the CCC are volunteer
activists with limited time to devote to reviewing the issues surrounding the cleanup of our
community, the time spent on the CCC feels more like misdirection than enhanced participation.
In conclusion, we submit that this Consent Decree, as it is now written is solely in General
Electric's best interests in terms of liability, and economic responsibility. It fails to protect the
interests and principles of the general public and federal, state and local governments and their
agencies, the environment, and the directly affected property owners and their communities for
which it is intended. Therefore, we ask that substantial modifications be made in this document,
as based on these comments, with many more opportunities for the interested public to submit
effective input, or to, ultimately, go back to mediation with all affected and interested parties
well-represented at the bargaining table for another effort at a more equitable and long-term
public-protective outcome. We would honor the opportunity to have a representative of Citizens
for PCB Removal appear before the Court for the purpose of addressing these comments and
concerns.
(Taken from The Pittsfield Gazette, Inc. 2001)
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APPENDIX C. Letter to Residents of Fill Properties from the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
Residential Properties which may contain Contaminated Fill from the
General Electric Company (GE)
Prepared by: The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in conjunction
with The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), together, "the Agencies"
August 7, 1997 (contact information revised August 16, 1999).
Sampling
Q: If I request that my property be tested because I suspect GE fill to be present, what exactly
happens next? What is the process that is put into motion?
A: If the Agencies find that there is credible information indicating that GE fill may be
present on your property, the Agencies will require GE to approach you to request access
for testing. GE will meet with you to gather information to develop an initial
investigation plan. GE will ask that you sign an access agreement to allow GE to perform
the required work. GE will submit a plan to the Agencies that details their planned
investigation for your property. The Agencies will review the plan and approve it
(possibly with conditions) and you will be notified by GE before sampling begins. In
approximately 45 days from the Agencies' approval of the sampling plan, you and the
Agencies will receive a report from GE that discusses the results and proposes next steps,
if necessary.
Q: Who determines which properties are tested, and how is this determined?
A: The Agencies determine which properties are tested and have established criteria for
screening. These criteria include information on the source of fill, physical evidence of
fill, anecdotal information regarding GE fill, etc. Additionally, for each property where
PCBs are detected, a complete property survey is conducted by GE to determine the
extent of fill. If there is any evidence that the fill may extend beyond the property
boundaries, neighboring properties are subsequently tested (under the process described
above) and continue to be tested until the extent of fill in the area is defined.
Q: Who decides where the sampling locations are and how many samples are taken?
A: GE proposes a plan containing proposed sampling locations based on the information
available about a specific property. The property owner and the Agencies each receive a
copy of the proposal. The Agencies review, comment and approve the plan before work
begins. Typically, the Agencies initially require a minimum of three borings in areas of
suspected fill. If contamination is found, a sampling "grid" is established which dictates
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the locations of surface soil samples and additional borings. Typically, the sampling grid
results in a sampling location every 25 feet.
Q: If GE tests my property and finds no PCBs, but finds other contaminants not related to GE,
what happens then?
A: The problem may still need to be addressed. Whether the contamination is addressed
and who is responsible for addressing it is dependent on many facts, such as origin, type,
quantity, concentration and location of contamination.
Q: Why are monitoring wells required on some of the properties?
A: An extensive investigation of a contaminated property includes an evaluation of
possible impacts to ground water. The Agencies requires use of monitoring wells on all
properties with extensive contamination. Some of the contaminants that have been found
on some properties may impact groundwater, if present in sufficient concentration.
Q: My neighbor knows he has GE fill on his property, but is afraid to come forward. He says he
doesn't want to know whether the property is contaminated. Can the Agencies investigate this
without disclosing how the information was obtained? If the Agencies say that someone
provided the information anonymously, he'll know it came from me.
A: The Agencies have received several anonymous tips that have led to sampling. No
sampling has occurred without a property owner allowing access. We will work with the
homeowner to allow access to GE to compete sampling. If there is fill on a property,
several people may have knowledge about it: the source(s) of the fill, the property owner
at the time of filling, neighbors in the area at the time of fill, the truck drivers and
personnel who hauled, loaded and unloaded the fill and other people in the neighborhood
may have spoken about it. If you choose to remain anonymous, the Agencies will honor
your request.
Q: How do I obtain a copy of the test results for my neighbor's property?
A: While we respect the privacy of the homeowners to the degree allowed by law, the
sampling results and related information is public. Currently, the data and reports are not
in the local information repositories. However, the data are presently available for public
review at the DEP office in Springfield, as it is with all hazardous waste sites, every
Wednesday from 9 - 12, and 1 - 4. You should call ahead (413-784-1100) to ensure that
that there have been no changes in schedule. The residential fill properties are filed under
their tax parcel identification numbers. However, the repositories will contain
information regarding the residential fill properties on or before September 1, 1997. The
repositories are listed at the end of this document.
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Additionally, if contamination on your neighbor's property extends to your property
boundary, you will be notified directly and requested to allow access to your property to
determine if the contamination extends beyond the parcel boundary onto your property.
Q: What about those of us that live within the neighborhoods where there are properties which
contain fill from GE; will sampling of our properties be performed so we don't have to convince
future buyers (of our properties) that our properties are not contaminated? Will we have
something in writing from the DEP or EPA explaining why our properties aren't sampled?
A: No wide-scale sampling is planned at this time. We are investigating and will
investigate properties where, based on credible information, GE fill may be located. For
each property where PCBs are detected, a complete property survey is conducted by GE
to determine the extent of fill. If there is any evidence that the fill may extend beyond the
property boundaries, the neighboring properties are subsequently tested and continue to
be tested until the extent of fill in the area is defined. However, if there is no sampling
performed at a property, there will not be something in writing from the Agencies, but we
are always available to answer questions from homeowners and prospective homeowners.
Q: Why doesn't GE just sample the entire neighborhood where PCB-contaminated fill has been
found?
A: Sampling must be based on reasonable basis and credible information suggestive that
there may be a problem related to GE fill.
Q: What assurances can I give to parents that it's safe for their children to be here unless some
soil testing is done? (From children's daycare facilities within neighborhoods containing
GE fill.)
A: The contamination we are encountering in fill does not move from the soil of one
property to the soil of another. PCBs and related contamination from GE is associated
with certain conditions, such as fill on a property, or property location within the 5-year
floodplain. You may want to determine who owned your property in the past and inquire
whether they have any information about fill or other relevant conditions.
Even if you have fill on your property, it may not be PCB-contaminated fill. If you have
questions, you should consult with the Agencies to determine if the situation warrants
sampling.
Q: How long does it take to obtain the sampling results?
A: Sampling results are typically obtained within four (4) weeks of sampling. The
process involves collection of the sample and subsequent laboratory analysis, preliminary
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reporting of results, and then the incorporation of the final laboratory results into a report
that interprets the importance of the data and proposes additional work. All of this work
is being conducted as quickly as possible. The Agencies consider four (4) weeks to be
fast for this type of work. Additionally, given that several properties are being
investigated all at once, the Agencies and GE have agreed to prioritize investigations
based on the likely exposures and extent of contamination.
Q: If I change my mind about having my property tested now, can I expect GE to sample it
sometime in the future, when I decide I want to sell my property?
A: Not necessarily. From the Agencies' perspective, now is the best time to determine if
your property is contaminated, if you have reason to believe that it may be. If you have
reason to believe that there may be contamination on your property, the Agencies
encourage you to come forward now. There are no assurances that the Agencies will
require GE to investigate your property in the future unless there is credible evidence
indicating that GE fill is located on your property. Also, once you are aware that there
may be contaminated fill on your property, your awareness may initiate the "statute of
limitations," which gives you a set period of time to pursue any legal claims you may
have.
Q: If I decide that I don't want my property tested, am I responsible and/or liable for what may
be on the property? Would I have an obligation to a future buyer to disclose that I had originally
requested that my property be tested, but then changed my mind?
A: Whether you are liable for any contamination on your property depends on the type,
concentration, quantity and location of contamination, as well as when the property
became contaminated, when the release occurred, and who caused the contamination.
You may have an obligation to disclose known conditions on your property if asked, but
you should talk to an attorney or real estate agent for advice.
Remediation
Q: Will all the contaminated fill be removed from the property?
A: The remedial action that the Agencies will approve is dependent upon site-specific
circumstances, including whether the home is placed on fill, the structural integrity of the
home, the depth of contaminated fill and the type and concentration of contamination at
depth. In some cases, not all contaminated fill will be removed. The Agencies must
ensure that the contamination on a property poses no significant risk to human health or
the environment. The Agencies also require an evaluation of the feasibility of achieving
background levels at a property.
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Q: How deep will GE be forced to dig in order to remove contaminated fill? And will this depth
vary depending upon whether I decide to keep my property or sell it to GE? If there is a
difference, why is there a difference?
A: Remedial actions may be different for each contaminated property, depending on the
extent and type of contamination and structural constraints on removal. A site-specific
evaluation will be conducted for each property. The extent of removal may also differ if
an "activity and use limitation" (such as, a deed restriction that limits uses that occur on
the property) is placed by the property owner. Any activity and use limitations which a
property owner proposes as part of a cleanup would require approval by the Agencies.
GE's purchase of a residential property could affect the depth of removal if GE places an
appropriate activity and use limitation on the property, but would not change the
requirement to achieve no significant risk.
Q: GE has asked to buy my home. If I decide to stay at my property, can I be assured that GE
will remove any contaminated fill from beneath my house?
A: No. If there is contaminated fill beneath your home, depending on the risk, location,
structural feasibility and cost, the Agencies may not require, and it may not be possible
for, removal of contamination from beneath your home. However, the Agencies will
require GE to investigate whether, and to what extent, there is any health or
environmental risk (if any) posed from contamination beneath a building.
Q: When will GE start the cleanup? How long will the cleanup take once started?
A: Each property is at a different stage of investigation and not all properties that will be
investigated will require cleanup. For those properties that are highly contaminated and
furthest along in the investigation process, it is the Agencies expectation that the cleanup
will begin this construction season. The duration of the cleanup will depend on the size
and difficulty of the cleanup (the area and extent of contamination, the depth of the soil to
be removed and any structural constraints that may affect the process, such as moving the
home, placement of reinforced sheeting to allow removal, etc.)
Q: Will my family and I have to move during the cleanup? If so, would someone pay for that?
A: The need to move during remediation may be necessary or preferable during the
remediation of some properties. This is dependent upon many site-specific factors such as
the extent of remediation, types of contamination, location of any necessary removal
action in relation to your home, and many other factors. GE has expressed a willingness
to work with the homeowner involved to handle any temporary relocation issues, if
necessary.
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Q: If GE buys all these residential properties, does that mean they can just put up a fence and
leave these properties as such, and not have to clean them? What does GE plan on doing with
the properties they purchase?
A: If GE purchases the property, it has expressed its intention to remediate the property
to allow intensive recreational use consistent with the residential character of the
neighborhood, without the need for fences. This would include remediation of the surface
soil (where the most intense exposures occur), as necessary, to allow for safe use.
However, as with any property owner, GE would have the right to fence any or all
portions of its property; but, any such fence would not be necessary for restricting
exposures, nor would it be required by the Agencies. GE has stated its intentions that
other than as temporary measures, it does not intend to fence or pave properties in
residential neighborhoods.
Q: If GE makes these properties into parks or recreational areas, is this okay with DEP and
EPA?
A: If there is a sufficient cleanup, this would be acceptable to the Agencies. If the plan is
to make these properties into parks or recreational areas in order to have a more limited
removal effort, this is an option, but not one that has GE's proposal and feasibility
evaluation in such a case. The feasibility evaluation must include an evaluation of the
feasibility of achieving background.
Nature of Contamination
Q: What does GE fill look like?
A: The look of GE fill is highly variable. However, the presence of non-native soil
objects, such things as scrap metal, broken porcelain insulator parts, wood block flooring,
etc., often appears in fill from GE. Additionally, some people have reported problems
with the growth of vegetation. However, we have no reason to believe that poor
vegetative growth alone indicates the presence of GE fill. However, we have no reason to
believe that poor vegetative growth indicates the presence of GE fill 1. Materials that are
solely consistent with residential garbage (cans, bottles, etc.) or construction debris (nails,
bricks); when present alone, are not strong indicators of the potential for contamination.
Q: How can you explain finding 20,000 ppm on one property, and not find anything on another
property just 10 feet away?
A: The contaminants in the fill are not evenly distributed on a property. Such high levels,
like 20,000 ppm may be indicative of formerly-saturated materials that have bonded to
soils or fullers earth. Fuller's earth is an absorbent clay-like material that was used in
filtering Pyranol and used in absorbing spills. The contamination is bound to the soil it
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has contaminated and the soil does not travel across a property, or from one property to
another.
Q: What other kinds of contamination are being found besides PCBs?
A: Contaminants other than PCBs, detected at some properties, at levels of concern
include semi-volatile organic compounds, metals, dioxins and furans.
Q: When the streams/creeks near the contaminated properties overflow/flood, does that cause
the PCBs to get to my property?
A: It may. It is dependent on the amount of sediment in the creek or stream, the presence
of PCB contamination in the sediment and the level of that PCB contamination. The
Agencies are currently requiring GE to investigate the extent of contamination in
sediment and adjacent bank soils.
Q: Why are the Agencies not concerned about PCB concentrations below 2 ppm?
A: Statewide, DEP has established a generic or general default cleanup level of 2 ppm
for PCBs for residential use. Average PCB levels below 2 ppm are not considered to pose
significant risk for residential use. A site-specific risk assessment may be conducted for a
site which may result in slightly different cleanup value.
Q: Do PCBs move through the soil?
A: PCBs, by and large, do not migrate through subsurface soil. Two important physical
characteristics of PCBs are that they tend to cling to soil particles and that they do not
dissolve easily in water. This means that PCBs are not moving around underground, but
will remain where they were placed.
Health Concerns
Q: I've worked at GE for over 20 years, and have lived on this property without exhibiting any
adverse health effects; so why should I consider leaving or selling my property, or changing my
daily outdoor routines? (From a property owner with high levels of contamination on
property)
A: While we cannot predict whether someone who has been exposed to PCBs will
experience an adverse health effect, we do know that every exposure can increase the
body's burden of PCBs. DEP and EPA have recommended several actions you may take
if you would like to reduce your exposures to PCBs - until the time a final cleanup is
complete. These are listed in the PCB Fact Sheet.
Q: A few people in my family who lived on this contaminated property have died from cancer;
is their death from cancer related to the fill on the property?
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A: It is difficult to determine whether a person's cancer was caused by PCB exposure
because there are so many people who get cancer and so many causes of cancer. The risk
that a person will develop cancer in his or her lifetime from any cause is about 1 in 3. We
do know that laboratory animals that were fed PCBs developed liver cancer. However,
studies of people exposed to PCBs, including workers exposed to high levels of PCBs,
have not provided definitive evidence that PCBs cause cancer in humans. The PCB Fact
Sheet provides more information about the potential health effects from PCB exposures
and provides recommendations about ways to minimize potential exposure.
Q: How do I know if I've been exposed to PCBs?
A: There are tests to find out if PCBs are in your blood, body fat, and breastmilk.
Because PCBs are found throughout the environment, nearly everyone is likely to have
some measurable amounts of PCBs in their body, whether or not they live in Pittsfield. In
the United States, average PCB levels in blood among people who have not had exposure
in the workplace range from 4 to 8 ng/mL (parts per billion). Elevated levels of PCBs in
comparison to the general population will show that you have been exposed to PCBs. The
tests do not determine the source of your exposure, the exact amount or type of PCBs you
have been exposed to, how long you have been exposed, or predict whether you will
develop harmful health effects. If you do not have elevated levels of PCBs in your body,
it is very unlikely that you have an increased risk of developing harmful health effects
compared with the general population.
Blood tests are the easiest and safest method for detecting recent exposures to large
amounts of PCBs. If you are concerned and want to find out whether you have been
exposed to PCBs, you should contact your doctor.
For additional information, contact:
J. Lyn Cutler



















To provide Berkshire County residents with easy access to information relevant to the
investigation and cleanup of the Housatonic River and GE Pittsfield sites, EPA and DEP have
established Information Repositories at the following locations:
Berkshire Athenaeum Public Library, Pittsfield, (413) 499-9488
Berkshire County Regional Planning Commission, Pittsfield, (413) 442-1521
Lenox Public Library, Lenox, (413) 637-0197
Simon's Rock College of Bard, Great Barrington, (413) 528-7274
All repositories contain official correspondence; Scopes of Work, and reports and documents
regarding the sites. Information is sent to the repositories as it becomes available.
(Taken from EPA New England's Website 2001)
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